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ABSTRACT
Stunning disasters result when donors, charities, and courts 
apply the law of gifts to transactions in which generous 
philanthropists donate and in exchange acquire naming rights over 
university buildings and other charitable spaces and places. Despite 
the natural inclination to apply the law of gifts to charitable 
contributions, this Article asserts that donors, charities, and courts 
would enjoy more predictable and reasonable results using contract 
law and practices for these vogue transactions. 
“It will not do to say that the bestowal of a name is a valueless act.”1
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INTRODUCTION
It seems obvious that we should apply the law of gifts to 
charitable donations. Unfortunately, this obvious approach has 
caused disasters in situations involving naming rights2 over 
charitable buildings and other properties.  
For example, in one case, a court’s choice of gift law over 
contract law allowed a donor who contributed only $50,000 of the 
initial $150,000 needed to build a university dormitory to recover 
over $1.2 million from the school when the school removed the 
donor’s name.3 Even more disturbing, this donor contributed nothing 
to a $2.5 million renovation of the dormitory,4 and this donor had 
enjoyed the exclusive naming rights for eighty years.5
In another case, an elderly donor contributed her life savings to 
a hospital.6 She expected the hospital to establish a lasting tribute to 
her deceased grandfather in connection with the donation,7 but she 
failed to express that intent at the appropriate time. Under the law of 
gifts, the court concluded that the hospital could keep all the money 
without honoring the donor, her grandfather, or anybody else, in any 
way.8 Despite noting the hospital’s “callousness” and its failure to 
“take great care to see that [the donation] was adequately 
 2. See John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in 
Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 
385 (2005) (describing naming rights transactions as situations in which a “donor’s 
name [is] associated in some way with the organization, its institutions, activities, or 
facilities”).  
 3. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) [hereinafter Daughters of the 
Confederacy]; Nick Anderson, Vanderbilt University Removes “Confederate” from 
Inscription at Front of Dorm, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/08/15/vanderbilt-university-removes-
confederate-from-inscription-at-front-of-dorm/ [https://perma.cc/A4SN-KEL9] 
(reporting that Vanderbilt University will pay $1.2 million). 
 4. Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 106. 
 5. See id. at 105 (reporting that the school finished constructing the 
dormitory in 1935, when it inscribed the donor’s name on the pediment); Anderson, 
supra note 3 (stating that Vanderbilt announced in August of 2016 that it will 
remove the donor’s name).  
 6. Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 865 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 7. Id. at 864-65. The donor’s grandfather was a surgeon at the hospital and 
a prominent member of the local community. Id. at 864. 
 8. Id. at 868. 
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recognized,” the court concluded that under the law of gifts it could 
not provide any remedy for the elderly donor or her family.9
Also, in a headline-grabbing story, a sophisticated charity’s 
failure to negotiate a reasonable duration for building naming rights 
cost the charity and its patrons dearly. In 1973, Lincoln Center was 
renovating its philharmonic hall. It accepted a $10.5 million donation 
from Avery Fisher, and it granted him perpetual naming rights.10 In 
2002, when Lincoln Center needed to renovate the hall again, the 
Fisher family threatened legal action to prevent renaming.11 The end 
result was that Lincoln Center delayed the renovation for over a 
decade while thousands of patrons, and many performing artists, 
endured the outdated, shabby facilities. In addition, when the parties 
finally settled in 2014, Lincoln Center paid the Fisher family $15 
million along with various perks.12 Amazingly, soon after the 
settlement with the Fishers, Lincoln Center made the same mistake 
again. It agreed that a new donor contributing approximately 20% of 
the cost of the concert hall’s renovation in 2015 would have 
perpetual naming rights over the renovated concert hall.13
This Article asserts that for these transactions the parties and 
the courts should embrace contract law, rather than the law of gifts, 
to minimize disputes and reach more reasonable results. Charitable 
naming rights are controversial. They are very popular with charities. 
Behavioral-economics research indicates that “publicity [sharply] 
increases charitable giving in [the] aggregate”14 and that “anonymity 
. . . causes low contributions.”15 On the other hand, moralist and 
armchair philosophers criticize the practice. These critics assert that 
 9. Id. at 867-68. 
 10. Robin Pogrebin, Lincoln Center to Rename Avery Fisher Hall, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/arts/music/lincoln-center-
to-rename-avery-fisher-hall.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XTY7-37BJ]. 
 11. Id. (reporting that Lincoln Center renovated all the other performing 
arts buildings at its campus before it could renovate Avery Fisher Hall). 
 12. Id.
 13. See Robin Pogrebin, David Geffen Captures Naming Rights to Avery 
Fisher Hall with Donation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/03/05/arts/david-geffen-captures-naming-rights-to-avery-fisher-hall-with-
donation.html [https://perma.cc/DH22-X9Q9] (stating that the decision to grant 
perpetual naming rights was shortsighted).  
 14. Brian Broughman & Robert Cooter, Charity and Information: 
Correcting the Failure of a Disjunctive Social Norm, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
871, 885 n.49 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 871. 
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publicity “contaminat[es] the spirit of philanthropy,”16 and they 
maintain that anonymous giving is more virtuous.17 Others stake out 
a middle ground, such as the art columnist who wrote, “[I]n the nine 
circles of hell that are nonprofit fundraising, surely the mildest sin is 
allowing benefactors to attach their names to parts of buildings . . . . 
[W]hat real harm is done by giving these donors a lift?”18
Despite some criticism, the practice has exploded since the 
mid-1990s.19 Today, perhaps “less than one percent of [substantial] 
charitable gifts are anonymous.”20 Surprisingly, there is scant legal 
scholarship on the negotiation and enforcement of these popular 
arrangements.21
 16. Pablo Eisenberg, Egotists Who Are Renaming New York City, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b25ba5a-7886-11dd-
acc3-0000779fd18c.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true [https://perma.cc/YE4J-PBKJ]. 
 17. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
 18. Lee Rosenbaum, The Isherwood Files: Should Donors Put Their Names 
on Elevators? Should Critics Speak on Ads for Events They Will Later Review?,
CULTUREGRRL (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2007/12/the_ 
isherwood_files_should_don.html [https://perma.cc/8SGG-X6TW]. 
 19. TERRY BURTON, NAMING RIGHTS: LEGACY GIFTS & CORPORATE 
MONEY 49 (2008) (“Since the mid-1990s, there has been a groundswell of naming 
rights activity.”). 
 20. Sarah Murray, Shush Funds: Anonymous Giving Exposed, OBSERVER
(Nov. 1, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://observer.com/2014/11/shush-funds-anonymity-
exposed/ [https://perma.cc/J5LY-BZPM] (“[R]esearch on the topic is admittedly 
limited,” presumably because the anonymous tend to be, obviously, shrouded in 
secrecy); Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1021 (1996) (reporting that in a limited study of school 
annual reports, less than 1% of all gifts were anonymous); see also Jack Shakely, 
Philanthropic Naming Rights, and Naming Wrongs, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015, 
5:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0311-shakely-philanthropy-
naming-rights-20150310-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GNZ-TETD] (“The anonymous 
gift is pretty much extinct in 21st century America anyway”); BURTON, supra note 
19, at 7-8 (describing an $85 million anonymous gift to fund a new Business School 
at the University of Wisconsin at Madison as “unprecedented”); Philip Fine, U.S.: 
Naming Rights Net Millions–But at a Price, U. WORLD NEWS (Mar. 2, 2008), http:// 
www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20080228160422788 [https://perma.cc/ 
GHB2-LXW2]. 
 21. The existing articles focus on trust law, morals clauses, and tax rules. 
See, e.g., Eason, supra note 2 (focusing on trust law in considering a charity’s 
options when it wants to remove a donor’s name after the donor has committed 
misdeeds or when the charity needs to resell the naming rights to raise funds to 
renovate the building); Adam Scott Goldberg, When Charitable Gift Agreements Go 
Bad: Why a Morals Clause Should Be Contained in Every Charitable Gift 
Agreement, 89 FLA. B.J. 48, 50 (2015). Commentators have considered the federal 
income tax implications of naming rights, or the lack thereof. See, e.g., John D. 
Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions 
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The judicial treatment of charitable pledges and naming rights 
has been controversial and confusing.22 Commentators often criticize 
Justice Cardozo’s landmark opinion on this topic.23 Courts may treat 
these arrangements as gifts, charitable trusts, or contracts.24 The legal 
characterization can turn on the intentions of the donor, and those 
intentions can be multifaceted, opaque, or indecipherable.25
Charities and donors sometimes appear perplexed when 
structuring these financial transactions.26 For example, charities 
frequently offer and grant perpetual naming rights for properties that 
will need to be renovated in twenty or thirty years, setting the stage 
for a conflict among the parties and their successors when the charity 
needs to grant naming rights to a big donor to underwrite a 
substantial part of the renovation.27 Also, donors and charities 
frequently fail to specify exit mechanisms if the misdeeds of the 
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 657 (2001); William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride 
Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45 (2011); Ethan G. Stone, 
Halos, Billboards, and the Taxation of Charitable Sponsorships, 82 IND. L.J. 213 
(2007).
 22. See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 
(N.Y. 1927) (“The law of charitable subscriptions has been a prolific source of 
controversy . . . .”); Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 442 P.2d 93, 95 (Ariz. 
1968) (commenting that the law in this area “is neither uniform nor well settled”). 
 23. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in 
Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1402 (1995) (stating that Justice 
Cardozo’s “analysis in Allegheny College is regularly criticized as contrived and 
artificial”); Peter Linzer, Consider Consideration, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1317, 1324 
(2000) (“[S]ome . . . say [Justice Cardozo’s legal analysis compares] with the 
misdirection of a three-card monte pitchman on the New York City subway.”); see 
also Matthew J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter 
of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1336 (1989) 
(referring to Allegheny College as a “landmark opinion”).  
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See Colombo, supra note 21, at 669 (discussing the work of academics 
in the social sciences to determine motives for charitable giving and stating that 
“human motivations are terribly complex”). 
 26. Goldberg, supra note 21; Chris Pomorski, Legacy Building: Paying to 
Write Your Name in Stone Doesn’t Always Ensure Immortality, OBSERVER (Nov. 1, 
2014, 10:17 AM), http://observer.com/2014/11/legacy-building-paying-to-write-your-
name-in-stone-doesnt-a [https://perma.cc/B3QV-ZZXZ]. 
 27. See, e.g., infra notes 492-97 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 199-207 and accompanying text (discussing St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc. v. 
McCarthy, 829 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). See generally Eason, supra note 
2 (discussing the availability of the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation 
after the donor has made all the promised donations and the charity wishes to 
remove the donor’s name). 
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donor, a related person, or the charity render the arrangement 
embarrassing for one side.28
This Article focuses on the choice between contract law or gift 
law in structuring and enforcing these arrangements. In a future 
article, I plan to reconcile the treatment of these arrangements as 
contracts for state law purposes with their treatment as tax-deductible 
gifts for federal income tax purposes. A scholar has already 
examined the application of trust law principles to older charitable 
naming rights arrangements when the donor has made all the 
promised donations, but the charity wishes to remove the donor’s 
name.29 Accordingly, this Article will discuss trust principles 
sparingly. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the creative,30
controversial, and expanding charitable naming rights market. 
Offering naming rights as a fundraising tool has spread from 
educational organizations to all types of nonprofits including 
hospitals, museums, zoos, social service organizations, and even our 
national parks.31 Naming opportunities seem limited only by the 
boundaries of human imagination. Donors emblazon their names on 
all sorts of real and personal property from the otter playground at 
the Louisville Zoo32 to the restrooms at Harvard Law School, the 
University of Colorado at Boulder, and the Museum of Modern Art 
in Manhattan.33 Donors name even the quarterback or linebacker 
positions on college football teams.34
 28. See generally Eason, supra note 2, at 394-98 (discussing transactions 
with “bad actors” and “shamed donors”); Goldberg, supra note 21, at 48. 
 29. See Eason, supra note 2. 
 30. See Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 1974) 
(“The scope of charitable pledges is as broad as human imagination and certainly 
there is no attempt by this Court to draw guidelines encompassing the breadth of 
creativity . . . .”).  
 31. Lisa Rein, Yosemite, Sponsored by Starbucks? National Parks to Start 
Selling Some Naming Rights, WASH. POST (May 9, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/09/yosemite-national-park-brought-to-
you-by-starbucks/ [https://perma.cc/F6G9-TTYE].  
 32. William P. Barrett, Cash Strapped Charities Put Donors’ Names on 
Just About Everything, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/forbes/2009/0921/creative-giving-cash-strapped-charities-donors-names.html 
[https://perma.cc/W3AP-KG27]. 
 33. Sarah Murray, Institutional Naming Rights Gaining Favour Among 
Wealthy Donors, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/5c1d62e0-
3834-11e4-a687-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/7BG7-NJP8]; Barrett, supra note 32 
(discussing the University of Colorado at Boulder restrooms); Michael Gross, 
Charities Get Inventive with Name-Dropping, NBC NEWS (June 14, 2008, 2:46 
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Part II analyzes when courts choose to classify charitable 
naming rights transactions as (i) gifts or (ii) contracts. The focus is 
on the largely ignored case law categorizing these transactions. This 
Part also discusses the case law from other honor or glory markets, 
including the baby-name market in which money is paid for the right 
to name a child, and the embarrassing secrets market in which hush 
money keeps secrets under wraps. 
Part III explores negotiating opportunities for charities and 
donors structuring charitable naming rights contracts. It also explores 
options for courts in resolving disputes. The Part focuses on the 
practices and doctrines available under contract law that can avoid 
the disasters encountered with the law of gifts. 
The conclusion highlights potential benefits for charities, 
donors, and courts in choosing contract law and practices in this area. 
Contract practices can introduce flexibility in structuring key terms 
such as the duration of naming rights for property that will 
eventually need renovation and morals clauses for when the donor or 
the charity threatens to tarnish the other’s reputation. Also, courts 
would have greater flexibility in resolving disputes. For example, if 
the parties fail to agree on an important term such as the duration for 
the naming rights to a building, under contract law the court may be 
able to supply a reasonable duration mechanism.35
I. THE EXPANDING, CREATIVE, AND CONTROVERSIAL MARKET FOR 
CONSPICUOUS GENEROSITY
A donor and a charity can structure a contribution relationship 
at a point along a publicity spectrum with complete anonymity at one 
end and enthusiastic broadcasting at the other end. With complete 
anonymity, no one would know the donor’s identity, not even the 
charity or other recipient. Some ancients considered complete 
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25147900/ns/us_news-giving/t/charities-get-inventive-
name-dropping/#.WCoCKXeZPVo [https://perma.cc/CG76-PV4C] (discussing a gift in 
excess of $100,000 from 83-year-old Jerome L. Stern “to see his and his wife 
Ellen’s names writ large—on the museum’s four restrooms”). 
 34. Drew Lindsay, How the Billion-Dollar College Football Industry Acts 
Like a Charity, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.philanthropy. 
com/article/How-the-Billion-Dollar-College/233203 [https://perma.cc/7TXD-R3ZK]
(“It is now possible . . . to endow a linebacker or quarterback the same way you 
might endow a chair for a Nobel Prize-winning economist or a Pulitzer Prize 
winner.” (quoting investigative journalist Gilbert Gaul)). 
 35. See infra notes 529-32 and accompanying text. 
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anonymity an act of great virtue.36 The primary texts of major 
religions include passages that seem to encourage anonymous 
giving.37 In Europe, donors still “tend to keep a low profile.”38
Today in the United States, complete anonymity is impractical 
for big donations. For one thing, a donor must receive a 
contemporaneous written receipt from the charity acknowledging the 
gift to claim a federal income tax charitable deduction.39 As a result, 
the charity must know the identity of the donor (or the donor’s 
entity)40 unless the donor is willing to forego the income tax 
deduction. In addition, a donor wishing extreme anonymity for a 
large contribution might need to employ money-laundering strategies 
to avoid disclosure under the banking laws.41
 36. The twelfth century Jewish philosopher and jurist Moses Maimonides 
ranked generosity on a scale of virtue, with anonymous generosity ranking high. 
Murray, supra note 20 (“Maimonides . . . ranked anonymous donations second 
(topped only by gifts, loans, or employment that lift people from dependence).”); see 
also Roy A. Walter, Volunteerism: Because We Care, Because It’s Right, 34 HOUS.
LAW. 50, 52 (1996); Anita L. Allen, Disrobed: The Constitution of Modesty, 51 
VILL. L. REV. 841, 844 (2006).  
 37. See Eric Konigsberg & Ben Ryder Howe, The Name Game: An Inside 
Look at the Politics of Donations, TOWN & COUNTRY MAG. (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-and-power/a5341/naming-rights-
philanthropy-anonymous-giving/ [https://perma.cc/V9N9-Z3XZ] (referring to the Bible 
and the Koran); see also Shakely, supra note 20 (“[T]he Purist School . . . embraces 
the Biblical admonition to let not your right hand know what your left hand is doing 
in almsgiving.”); Pablo Eisenberg, Stop Appealing to Billionaire Egos with Naming 
Rights, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/ 
article/opinion-stop-appealing-to/228459 [https://perma.cc/8UGE-2CE5] (“[F]undraisers 
have encouraged one of the most distressing features in our society: The 
extraordinarily inflated egos of America’s growing number of multimillionaires and 
billionaires.”).  
 38. Murray, supra note 33.  
 39. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (2015) (applying to gifts over $250). 
 40. A donor might attempt to keep his or her identity secret by funneling 
the money through an entity, but in that case, the donor would need to disclose the 
name of the entity to the charity to receive the receipt from the charity and benefit 
from a federal income tax charitable deduction. Id. Also, charities are required to list 
substantial donors on Schedule B of IRS Form 990, which is the annual information 
return each charity must file with the IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. SCHEDULE B, 
FORM 990, Schedule of Contributors (2016), https://www.irs.gov./pub/irs-pdf/
f990ezb.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X8R-PCAZ] (generally requiring that the charity list 
donors who contributed $5,000 or more during the year).  
 41. See Max Biedermann, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 
BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 72, 72 (2015) (discussing the use of “shell 
corporations . . . to hide the true owners of assets”); see also Jack B. Siegel, “Try to 
Be Pure at Heart, They Arrest You for Robbery:” Ethical Issues Facing the 
Nonprofit Practitioner, ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS, Nov. 13-14, 2014, SW011-
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Historically, relative anonymity in giving was more common.42
“In the U.S., [relative] philanthropic secrecy was once ‘the thing to 
do.’”43 Before the mid-1990s, many donors were content with what I 
would call “strategic publicity” or “peer publicity.” Many wealthy 
donors interviewed in a dissertation study in the early 1990s were 
satisfied as long as the charity’s other big donors were aware of their 
contributions. As described in her book, Why the Wealthy Give: 
The Culture of Elite Philanthropy,44 written on the cusp of the 
naming revolution, Francie Ostrower summarized her interviews 
with scores of generous philanthropists and found that often their 
primary desire was obtaining a position on the charity’s board of 
directors or another important charitable committee. These donors 
anticipated that capturing a place on the board or committee would 
give them the opportunity to meet, mix, and mingle with the other 
big givers and secure business and other practical advantages from 
these associations. These donors expressed little or no interest in 
having their names plastered on facades, foyers, or other places and 
spaces.  
While the norm likely was greater anonymity historically, it 
seems there were usually some exceptions. Commentators discuss 
charitable givers who had their names engraved on Sumerian tablets 
5,000 years ago.45 In 1502, King Henry VII’s mother established 
what is believed to be the first named endowed professorship, the 
Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity.46 In 1639, John Harvard 
ALI-CLE 285 (available on Westlaw) (posing a hypothetical involving a client 
attempting to donate anonymously by passing the money through her attorney’s trust 
fund account); Murray, supra note 20 (discussing the maneuvers of “duty-free 
magnate Charles F. Feeney . . . [who] covertly doled out billions” through subsidies 
of an off-shore foundation staffed with employees sworn to secrecy). 
 42. See Eisenberg, supra note 37 (“Whatever happened to anonymous 
giving?”); Charles Isherwood, The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/theater/02ishe.html [https://perma. 
cc/HPP3-3XBH] (“Whatever happened to Anonymous? . . . [W]hat became of those 
wealthy philanthropists who used to support . . . charitable institutions without 
requiring that their names be slapped somewhere—anywhere, it sometimes seems—
on a building.”). 
 43. Murray, supra note 20 (quoting fundraising expert Robert Osborne). 
 44. See generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE 
CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY (1997).  
 45. Eason, supra note 2, at 379 n.9 (citing Henry Goldstein, When Wealthy 
Philanthropists Put Their Mouth Where Their Money Is, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY
(Nov. 28, 2002), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/When-Wealthy-Philanthropists/
189121 [https://perma.cc/8E9B-AHRC]). 
 46. BURTON, supra note 19, at 114. 
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acquired naming rights for a new university near Boston, 
Massachusetts, in exchange for his gift of 400 books and 779 British 
pounds.47 Powerful tycoons of the industrial revolution, such as 
Carnegie, Sage, and Kellogg, aggressively publicized their 
philanthropy perhaps in attempts to redeem their reputations 
besmirched by reports of greed.48 John D. Rockefeller, Eli Lilly, 
Andrew Carnegie, and other titans of industry often used charitable 
trusts to facilitate their generosity and promote publicity.49 When 
asked about Andrew Carnegie’s elephantine philanthropic giving, 
including endowing a staggering 3,500 libraries, Mark Twain 
commented, “He has bought fame and paid cash for it . . . . He has 
arranged that his name shall be famous in the mouths of men for 
centuries to come.”50
Today, a charity embarking on a major capital campaign could 
be accused of jeopardizing its charitable mission if it failed to sell 
naming rights.51 Also, it might be considered ungrateful.52 Charities 
have been advertising the sale of naming rights in exchange for 
online donations, listing the naming opportunities menu style.53 One 
charitable insider says, “[C]urrently [the] dominant model is 
Transactional Philanthropy.”54
A broad survey discovered a dramatic rise in charitable naming 
in the mid-1990s.55 Educational institutions led the way by granting 
charitable naming rights for campuses and quads, lecture halls and 
libraries, and classrooms and conference rooms, as well as 
scholarship funds and endowed professorships.56 The expansion in 
 47. Barrett, supra note 32. 
 48. See William H. Byrnes, IV, The Private Foundation’s Topsy Turvy 
Road in the American Political Process, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 496, 531-32 
(2004).
 49. Id.
 50. Konigsburg, supra note 37.  
 51. BURTON, supra note 19, at xvii, 134 (“If your organization does not ask 
a qualified donor about making a named gift, there is a high probability that another 
one will.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 867 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (describing a charity’s failure to grant naming rights as 
callous).
 53. See generally Drew Lindsay, YourNameHere.Org, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, June 2015, at 20. See also Barrett, supra note 32, at 74.  
 54. Shakely, supra note 20. Mr. Shakely is president emeritus of the 
California Community Foundation. 
 55. BURTON, supra note 19, at 49 (“Since the mid-1990s, there has been a 
groundswell of naming rights activity.”); see also id. at xi (discussing the survey). 
 56. See id. at 7. 
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the market also comes from other charities adopting this ethos, 
including hospitals,57 symphony orchestras,58 theatres,59 museums,60
public school districts,61 and even national parks.62 All of these types 
of institutions, and more,63 have been adopting charitable naming 
rights initiatives.  
In another new twist, it’s been alleged that a candidate for 
governor in the midst of a campaign contributed to a state university 
and named the university’s computer science school after himself in 
an attempt to influence voters. In response, other politicians 
sponsored a bill to prevent public schools from naming their 
properties after a candidate for office.64 A union official wrote a letter 
to the University Board of Regents stating the University System 
should not allow itself to be “used as a pawn for political gain” and 
remarked, “So now they are going to buy titles at universities and get 
press for it in an election cycle? I can’t imagine anything that is more 
inappropriate.”65 The candidate won the primary in June of 2016.66
 57. Id. at 138-39, 148 (noting that “[h]ospitals . . . have taken on aggressive 
naming initiatives”). 
 58. See Pogrebin, supra note 13 (discussing naming rights for an orchestra 
hall). 
 59. BURTON, supra note 19, at 137-38. 
 60. Id. at 58-59; see Rosenbaum, supra note 18 (discussing The Brooklyn 
Museum’s program allowing members of the public to “adopt” a work of art; in 
exchange for a donation, the museum acknowledged the donor on the wall label next 
to the art work). 
 61. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s 
Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2007) (discussing “dozens—if not hundreds—of 
public schools [signing] naming rights deals” in the immediate wake of a transaction 
between an East Coast school district and the ShopRite grocery chain). 
 62. See Knowledge Wharton, Selling America’s National Parks,
VALUEWALK, July 4, 2016, 2016 WLNR 20369737 (emphasizing that the national 
parks are only selling “indoor” naming rights); Rein, supra note 31.  
 63. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 119 (including YWCAs and 
environmental groups); id. at 49-50 (“Not only nonprofits but other organizations as 
well, including municipalities, state and federal government departments, are out 
there marketing their shopping list to would-be supporters.”). 
 64. See Troy Carter, Lawmakers Propose Bill in Response to Gianforte’s MSU 
Donation, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (May 17, 2016), http://www.bozemandailychronicle. 
com/news/politics/lawmakers-propose-bill-in-response-to-gianforte-s-msu-donation/ 
article_4993e3bd-09e8-529a-969a-fde4d17a2599.html [https://perma.cc/55ZW-EMJ7]; 
Gail Schontzler, Students Criticize School Naming; MSU’s Cruzado Willing to Talk,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., May 25, 2016, at A1, 2016 WLNR 15918111. 
 65. Corin Cates-Carney & Eric Whitney, Montana Dems Cry Foul Over 
‘Gianforte School of Computing’ at MSU, MONT. PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2016) 
(quoting Al Eckblad, AFL-CIO Executive Secretary), http://mtpr.org/post/montana-
dems-cry-foul-over-gianforte-school-computing-msu [https://perma.cc/5NJW-52CU]. 
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This could become another trend driving the charitable naming rights 
market. 
Along with the entrance of different types of charities, the 
naming rights market has grown thanks to the boundless imagination 
of philanthropic-development professionals who find new things and 
funds to name.67 Naming rights for buildings, atriums, elevators, 
offices, staircases, and other major physical places and spaces are 
passé. The modern naming rights market includes almost all tangible 
charitable properties from green rooms at theaters68 to restrooms at 
law schools.69 Furthermore, while scholarship funds and endowed 
professorships bearing the donor’s name are “more common than the 
grass in the summer,”70 donors are now endowing all sorts of 
positions and functions, from the clinical research director of a 
hospital71 to the linebackers and the quarterback on a college football 
team.72
With the coming of the digital age and social media, charities 
have taken the marketing of naming rights to a new level. In 
connection with major fund drives, many charities now advertise 
naming opportunities and the related “ask amounts,” like a shopping 
list on the charity’s website.73 As an example, in 2015, Fordham Law 
 66. Phil Drake, Governor’s Race, GREAT FALLS TRIB., June 8, 2016, at A3, 
2016 WLNR 17481577 (reporting that Greg Gianforte will face Steve Bullock in the 
general election for governor).  
 67. BURTON, supra note 19, at 146 (“[T]he areas and items that can be 
named are limited only by your imagination.”); Barrett, supra note 32 (“Nonprofits 
creatively mine money from names, partly by subdividing their turf.”). 
 68. BURTON, supra note 19, at 138-39 (discussing naming rights for a green 
room in a theatre and nurses’ stations at a hospital); Isherwood, supra note 42 
(discussing naming rights throughout theaters); Pomorski, supra note 26 (reporting 
that former broadcaster Barbara Walters donated $10 million to name the Acute 
Care Medical Treatment Center inside a New York hospital). 
 69. See Murray, supra note 33 (reporting that one donor has contributed and 
named restrooms at Harvard Law School and Berkeley Law School); see also
BURTON, supra note 19, at 135-36 (listing other types of properties, including 
gardens, parking lots, and walkways).  
 70. Fine, supra note 20 (quoting Jonathan Knight of the Association of 
American University Professors). 
 71. BURTON, supra note 19, at 120 (discussing endowed chairs in clinical 
research). 
 72. Lindsay, supra note 34 (“It is now possible . . . to endow a linebacker or 
quarterback the same way you might endow a chair for a Nobel Prize-winning 
economist or a Pulitzer Prize winner.” (quoting investigative journalist Gilbert 
Gaul)).
 73. See Lindsay, supra note 53, at 20; see also BURTON, supra note 19, at 
88-89.
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School advertised 249 naming opportunities on its website as part of 
the fund drive for its new law school.74
Also, corporations and other commercial entities are becoming 
active players in the charitable naming rights market.75 Initially, 
colleges and universities were slow to embrace corporate names on 
their scholarly structures.76 As an example, in 2007, the University of 
Washington publicly disclosed its “Facilities and Spaces Naming 
Policy,” which encouraged corporations to give, but to grant the 
naming rights to “a person or family important to [the] success [of 
the business].”77 A commentator warned that a corporation’s 
practices might tarnish the reputation of a revered institution.78
Corporations gained a foothold with naming college athletic 
stadiums and fields.79 In 1996, the University of Louisville became 
the first Division 1A80 school to name its football stadium after a 
corporation with Papa John’s Stadium.81 Many similar arrangements 
have continued this college athletic commercialism.82 In 2007, a 
 74. New Law School Building Naming Opportunities, FORDHAM U. (on file 
with the author); see New Law School Building, FORDHAM U., http://law.fordham. 
edu/1461.htm [https://perma.cc/NN26-LWPL] (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (“Giving 
levels range from $1,000 for furnishings and locker[s] to $25,000,000 to name the 
building.”); Lindsay, supra note 53, at 21-22. 
 75. BURTON, supra note 19, at 10. 
 76. Id. at 13, 141. 
 77. University of Washington: Facilities and Spaces Naming Policy 
(Campaign University of Washington: Creating Future Facilities and Spaces 
Naming Policy), reprinted in BURTON, supra note 19, at 202. 
 78. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 173 (emphasizing that the charity should 
have the right to revoke the corporation’s name in the event of a “corporate scandal” 
such as with Enron or WorldCom). 
 79. See Mike Tanier, When Colleges Dedicate Courts, Squabbles Often 
Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/sports/ 
ncaabasketball/when-colleges-dedicate-courts-squabbles-often-follow.html [https:// 
perma.cc/V9CS-9HQY] (“For strapped institutions, the alternative to dedicating the 
hardwood to a coach is selling the naming rights to a corporation.”). 
 80. See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College 
Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 110 n.4 (2010) (explaining that prior to 2006, 
the NCAA used the term “Division 1A” to refer to the most competitive collegiate 
sports programs; after 2005, the 120 most competitive sports universities were 
members of the “Football Bowl Subdivision”).
 81. Alex Davis, Yum Puts Its Name on U of L Center, COURIER J.
(LOUISVILLE), Sept. 20, 2006, at D1, 2006 WLNR 25049364. 
 82. See, e.g., Andrea Adelson, Schools Going Corporate, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, July 5, 2010, at C2, 2010 WLNR 13458369; Kristi Dosh, Naming Rights 
on College Stadiums and Arenas, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (June 21, 2011), 
http://businessofcollegesports.com/2011/06/21/naming-rights-on-college-stadiums-
and-arenas [https://perma.cc/N4YB-LQK3]. 
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researcher wrote, “The nonprofit sector has begun to see a tidal wave
of corporate acquisitions of nonprofit naming rights on a multitude 
of properties.”83 Also, corporations are beginning to acquire naming 
rights over academic buildings at major universities. The law school 
at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri is named Anheuser-
Busch Hall,84 and AT&T “has naming rights to the AT&T Executive 
Education and Conference Center at the University of Texas.”85
II. CHOOSING THE LAW OF GIFTS OR THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
A. The Law of Gifts: The Natural Inclination Leading to Extreme 
Results 
The terminology surrounding charitable contributions and 
related naming rights likely encourages donors, charities, advisors, 
and courts to think of these arrangements as gifts, rather than 
contracts. Often these arrangements spring from capital campaigns or 
other fund drives86 featuring altruistic-sounding slogans, such as 
“Building the Dream”87 or “The World Is Waiting: The Campaign for 
Harvard Medicine.”88 Charities usually market naming rights in 
exchange for big contributions as naming “opportunities.”89 Also, a 
charity may anticipate documenting a donation with only a pledge 
card or other form less than one page in length90 rather than with a 
multi-page contract with extensive boilerplate typically used for big-
money transactions. Charities may hope this brevity will encourage 
 83. BURTON, supra note 19, at 150 (emphasis added). 
 84. Richard B. Kuhns, “Instant Tradition”—A Challenge to Legal 
Education in the Twenty-First Century, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 203, 203 (1998). 
 85. BURTON, supra note 19, at 73.  
 86. Id. at 52 (referring to “fundraising campaigns and the naming rights 
gifts they attract”). 
 87. See, e.g., Building the Dream, Naming Opportunities, HOSPICE OF THE 
PANHANDLE (last updated May 2012), http://www.hospiceotp.org/files/images/
Naming%20Opportunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVV4-BE67]. 
 88. The World Is Waiting: The Campaign for Harvard Medicine, HARV.
MED. SCH. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://hms.harvard.edu/world-waiting [https://perma.cc/ 
6QTD-9ZR2]. 
 89. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 134. 
 90. See William A. Drennan, Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 477, 495 (2015); Pomorski, supra note 26 (quoting Ellis 
Carter, a lawyer representing both charities and donors, stating “I’ve seen very 
explicit agreements, but I’ve also seen instances where people make naming rights 
gifts with nothing more than a pledge form—just trusting the institution”). 
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prospective donors to act promptly on their generous impulses91
without consulting attorneys, accountants, or financial planners who 
often assist with lengthy, complex documents.  
Tax advisors and other experts92 accurately inform everyone 
involved that the federal income tax law treats these arrangements as 
gifts, and the donor is allowed to deduct all amounts contributed as a 
charitable “gift”93 regardless of the level or value of public 
recognition given in exchange,94 the aggressiveness of the charity in 
hawking the naming rights, and the amount of haggling involved.95
Pursuant to the income tax rules, the charity will issue a written 
receipt proclaiming that no goods or services were given in return96
for the donation even when the donor aggressively bargained for 
prominent naming rights or other forms of public recognition.97 Also, 
when publicizing the naming contribution in press releases, on 
websites, or at banquets or groundbreaking ceremonies, charities use 
phrases such as “generous gift” or “principal benefactor.”98 Thus, in 
 91. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-6 
(1979) (observing that “actors involved in a donative transaction are often 
emotionally involved”); Mary Frances Budig, Gordon T. Butler & Lynne M. 
Murphy, Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They Enforceable and Must They 
Be Enforced?, 27 U. S.F. L. REV. 47, 59 (1992) (“Charitable solicitations are often 
charged with high emotions.”). 
 92. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. TOCE, JR. ET AL., TAX ECONOMICS OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING 197 (2006) (discussing donor recognition and concluding that 
“the contribution deduction amount should be unaffected”); Stone, supra note 21, at 
222 (stating that acknowledgements “would not prevent donors from deducting the 
. . . contributions as charitable donations”). See generally Colombo, supra note 21.  
 93. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2015) (describing a tax-deductible 
contribution to charity as a “gift”). 
 94. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (1968) (“Such privileges as being 
associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are not 
significant return benefits that have a monetary value . . . .”). 
 95. See Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (1973) (describing a situation in 
which the parties obtained a court order holding that a charity could change its name 
to adopt the donor’s name and bind itself not to change its name again for ninety-
nine years).  
 96. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B) (applying to contributions of $250 or more); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(2) (1996). 
 97. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104; see also supra note 94; Rev. 
Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193 (1977) (involving a charity that named its facility 
after a corporate donor and mentioned the corporate donor in every publication the 
corporation financed).  
 98. See, e.g., Spring Arbor Univ., Groundbreaking Ceremony for SAU’s 
New Tennis Facility, SAU BLOG (June 3, 2016), https://www.arbor.edu/posts/2016/ 
06/03/tennis-complex/ [https://perma.cc/JX8C-2UH6] (regarding the ceremony at 
Spring Arbor University for the “upgrades [to the tennis courts] made possible 
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these naming deals, there may be a barrage of verbiage signaling that 
the transaction is a gift. In contrast, the argot of the contracts world 
may be absent. There is seldom any public mention of offer, 
acceptance, consideration, exchange, or bargain. As a result, it is not 
surprising when charities, donors, and their advisors fail to draft 
multi-page contracts even if substantial amounts are involved,99 and 
when courts seem drawn to analyze these transactions under the law 
of gifts.100 In 2014, an attorney practicing in this area stated, “I’ve 
seen very explicit agreements, but I’ve also seen instances where 
people make naming rights gifts with nothing more than a pledge 
form.”101
A gift is a “voluntary transfer of property by one to another, 
without any consideration.”102 A contract or sale is for consideration; 
a gift is not.103 Under the law of gifts, courts and commentators state 
that the number of necessary elements is as few as two104 or as many 
as six.105
In charitable naming rights transactions, the most challenging 
element likely will be whether the donor “intends to make a gift.”106
The other five elements are less likely to trigger controversy because 
it often will be clear whether: (i) the donor had the requisite mental 
capacity;107 (ii) the donor delivered the money or property pledged; 
thanks to a generous gift from Ron and Marvel Jones”); Dennis Brown, Jordan Hall 
Groundbreaking Ceremony Set for Saturday, NOTRE DAME NEWS (Oct. 29, 2003), 
http://news.nd.edu/news/6294-jordan-hall-groundbreaking-ceremony-set-for-Saturday 
[https://perma.cc/M9Q4-FULM] (referring to the “hall’s principal benefactor John W. 
‘Jay’ Jordan”). 
 99. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 50 (indicating that documents drafted 
for charitable naming arrangements often lack typical contract language).  
 100. See, e.g., Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see infra notes 164-91 
and accompanying text (discussing the Daughters of the Confederacy case).  
 101. Pomorski, supra note 26 (quoting attorney Ellis Carter). 
 102. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 1 (2008); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 2 (2010). 
 103. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 2 (“Due to the absence of consideration for a 
gift, a gift inter vivos does not come within the legal definition of a contract . . . . 
Likewise, the chief distinction between a sale and a gift is that valuable 
consideration is necessary to support a sale . . . .”). 
 104. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 1 (stating that a gift “requires two things: a delivery 
of the possession of the property to the donee, and an intent that the title thereto 
shall pass immediately to him or her”).  
 105. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 14; 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 10.  
 106. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 10; see infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
 107. See 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 12 (“As a general rule, any person of legal age, 
having the mental capacity to understand the nature of the transaction, may be the 
donor of property . . . .”). 
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(iii) the charity accepted the money or property contributed;108 (iv) 
the donor is “divest[ed] of all control” of the money or property 
contributed;109 and (v) the contribution of money or property was 
absolute.110
The donor must intend to irrevocably transfer title currently to 
the donee without consideration. Without this intent, there is no 
gift.111 The donor’s intent must be “clear and unmistakable . . . and 
this contention must be inconsistent with any other theory.”112 In 
contrast to the intent associated with forming a contract, which is 
mutual between the parties, the intent required to make a gift is 
“entirely unilateral.”113
Whether the alleged donor had the requisite intent to make a 
gift is a question of fact.114 The party seeking to establish a gift must 
present “clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal” evidence of the intent 
to make a gift,115 but no specific language is required.116 Courts 
determine intent based on all the facts and circumstances, which may 
include the words of any relevant instrument, the donor’s actions, 
and the relationship of the donor and donee.117
 108. Cluck v. Ford, 152 P.3d 279, 282-83 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (noting 
that if the gift is beneficial, the court may presume acceptance); Brown v. Brown, 
501 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 109. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 10. 
 110. Id.
 111. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007); see 
generally 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 16; 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 15.  
 112. Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 732 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Neb. 2007).  
 113. Brown, 501 So. 2d at 27 (contrasting a unilateral intent in the case of a 
gift on the one hand with a contract in which the parties have a “meeting of the 
minds”).
 114. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 16; Cluck v. Ford, 152 P.3d 279, 283 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 2006) (“Where there is conflicting evidence, the trial court’s 
determination will not be set aside unless the determination is clearly against the 
weight of the evidence.”).  
 115. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 15; see also Ferer, 732 N.W.2d at 673-74; 
Wash. Univ., 490 F.3d at 674 (requiring “clear and convincing evidence”). 
 116. Wash. Univ., 490 F.3d at 674. But see Prentis Family Found. v. 
Karmanos Cancer Inst., 698 N.W.2d 900, 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasizing 
that the agreement failed to use the words “in consideration for” and instead used the 
phrase “[in] recognition of and appreciation to” in concluding that the naming 
arrangement was a gift and not a contract). 
 117. Wash. Univ., 490 F.3d at 674; see 38A C.J.S. § 10 (citing Zink v. 
Stafford, 509 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 1999)). But see Knight v. Knight, 182 A.D.2d 342, 
344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (concluding that the donor’s intent could be determined 
from the gifting instrument and the circumstances surrounding its execution). 
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For example, in Washington University v. Catalona,118 the 
University and one of its former prominent cancer researchers, who 
had recently jumped to another major research university, argued 
about whether human research subjects made completed gifts of their 
biological samples to Washington University, or whether the 
research subjects were free to redirect the samples to the researcher’s 
new university. The court considered as evidence the language of the 
brochure soliciting human research subjects, the language of the 
consent form referring to “‘donation[s]’ of bodily tissues or blood,” 
and the relationship of the parties.119 The court concluded that the 
human research subjects made completed gifts to Washington 
University when the samples were drawn and could not reassign 
those samples to another university.  
1. Promises to Make a Future Gift 
Outside the charitable giving arena, it is axiomatic that a mere 
promise to make a gift in the future is unenforceable.120 “Words alone 
. . . are not [enough] . . . .”121 Even a signed document promising a 
future gift is insufficient.122
For example, in the classic case of Dougherty v. Salt,123 Aunt 
Tillie orally promised to make a $3,000 gift to her eight-year-old 
nephew Charlie. At the goading of Charlie’s guardian,124 Aunt Tillie 
signed a promissory note stating that her estate would pay nephew 
 118. Wash. Univ., 490 F.3d at 667 (concluding that under the particular facts, 
research subjects made irrevocable gifts when contributing biological samples). 
 119. Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added). 
 120. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 18 (“A promise to make a gift in the future . . . 
is revocable at any time until the gift is executed.”); Brown v. Brown, 501 So. 2d 24, 
27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 
864, 866 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 121. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 18; In re Estate of Piper, 676 S.W.2d 897, 899 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 122. See Bobo v. Stansberry, 834 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) 
(“And even if there had been a delivery of the paper during the life of the donor, ‘the 
gift of the maker’s own note is the delivery of a promise only, and not of the thing 
promised, and the gift therefore fails.’” (citation omitted)). 
 123. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919) (concluding an aunt 
made an unenforceable promise to make a gift in the future to her nephew, even 
though she signed a promissory note). 
 124. Id. (reporting that after Aunt Tilly said she would “take care” of 
Charlie, and that “she loved him very much,” Charlie’s guardian said to Aunt Tilly, 
“I know you do, Tillie, but your taking care of the child will be done probably like 
your brother and sister done, take it out in talk”).  
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Charlie $3,000 if she failed to pay Charlie during her lifetime. Aunt 
Tillie hand delivered the promissory note to Charlie and said, “[D]o 
not lose it. Some day it will be valuable.”125 Upon Aunt Tillie’s 
death, Charlie sued her estate to collect the $3,000. The court 
concluded that Aunt Tillie merely made an unenforceable promise to 
make a gift in the future. There was no enforceable contract because 
there was no consideration to support Aunt Tillie’s promise.126
Several policy arguments support this view that a promise to 
make a gift in the future should not be enforceable. One scholar 
writes, “Where a donative promise is based on affective 
considerations, in the absence of reliance a donative promisee is 
morally obligated to release a repenting promisor.”127 Furthermore, 
with no consideration, there is no bargain, no quid pro quo, and no 
mutual agreement for the court to enforce.  
Also, events occurring after the donor promises to give, but 
before he or she delivers the cash or property, may make 
enforcement inappropriate. For example, an aunt might promise to 
make a substantial gift to her eight-year-old nephew, and soon 
thereafter the aunt’s home might be destroyed in a fire or flood so 
that her family would not be able to afford food and housing and 
would need government assistance if a court enforced the gift.128 In 
that situation, justice might be better served if a court refused to 
enforce the gift. Similarly, if the aunt promised to make a gift to her 
nephew, but the nephew intentionally trashed the aunt’s living room 
in an angry rage before the aunt delivered the money, again justice 
might be better served by not forcing aunt to make the gift.129 These 
policies may explain, in part, why “[n]o legal system enforces all 
promises.”130
With this legal and policy foundation, it might seem that in the 
absence of naming rights or other consideration, a donor’s promise to 
contribute to a charity in the future would be unenforceable, and the 
old axiom that a promise to make a gift in the future is unenforceable 
would prevail. But U.S. courts have followed these fundamental 
 125. Id. at 95.  
 126. Id. (also stating that Aunt Tillie “was not paying a debt. She was 
conferring a bounty”). 
 127. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 821, 821 (1997). 
 128. See Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 4-6. 
 129. Id.
 130. JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO 
ON CONTRACTS 149 (6th ed. 2009). 
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principles in only a handful of charitable giving cases with particular 
facts.131
In contrast, in the vast majority of charitable giving cases, 
courts create legal fictions to enforce a mere promise to contribute to 
a charity in the future.132 Courts typically use special terminology, 
referring to a future promise to make a gift to a charity as a “pledge” 
 131. Common facts in these cases tend to include: (i) the donor died before 
completing the pledge; (ii) the donor did not specify a particular use for the 
donation; and (iii) there was no evidence supporting the assertion that naming rights 
induced the donor’s gift. For example, in Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, 
Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1974), Harry Burt executed two pledges of 
$50,000 each but contributed only $20,000 total before his death. The only 
consideration recited in the pledge forms was “to induce the subscription of others,” 
and most importantly, the pledge forms did not state any particular purpose for the 
donated funds. See id. at 486. The Hospital sued to enforce the pledges, but the 
Florida Supreme Court concluded there was no contract because there was no 
consideration. Id. at 486-87. Also, the court found that the Hospital failed to show 
reliance on the pledge under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 487. 
Also, in the case of In re Bashas’ Inc., 468 B.R. 381, 382-83 (D. Ariz. 
2012), the court refused to enforce a corporation’s pledge to pay $25,000 per year 
for ten years to St. Joseph’s Foundation and Barrow Neurological Foundation after 
the donor declared bankruptcy under chapter 11. The court refused to enforce the 
pledge in part because: (i) although the pledge arose out of St. Joseph’s Pushing 
Boundaries Capital Campaign to finance construction of a new medical tower, the 
donor’s letter did not mention a specific purpose for the gift; and (ii) the charity 
made no promise to publicly honor the donor. Id. at 383.  
Similarly, in Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 
N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989), the court refused to enforce a pledge when the donor had 
died because there was “no indication as to how the money should be used, or what 
[the Congregation] was required to do if anything in return for this promise,” id. at 
692, 694, and the charity failed to show sufficient reliance. Id. at 693 (concluding 
that merely allocating the $25,000 pledge in its budget was insufficient to prove 
reliance). Also in DeLeo, the pledge was oral. Id. at 692. Furthermore, although the 
charity argued that it planned to renovate a storage room into a library and name it 
after the donor, “there [was] no evidence in the record that the Congregation’s plans 
to name [the] library after the decedent induced him to make or to renew his 
promise.” Id. at 692. See also Dalhousie Coll. at Halifax v. Boutilier Estate, [1934] 
S.C.R. 642 (Can.) (describing in great detail why a court should not enforce a mere 
promise to make a gift to a charity). Dalhousie is cited in Budig et al., supra note 91, 
at 146, under “Foreign Cases” as Governors of Dalhousie College v. Estate of 
Boutilier, 3 D.L.R. 593 (Can. 1934).  
 132. See PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 225 (“With great 
frequency, but not with complete uniformity, charitable subscriptions have been 
enforced in [the U.S.].”); Budig et al., supra note 91, at 49-50 & n.3 (“[T]he result 
[generally] has been the enforcement of charitable subscriptions . . . .”). 
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or a “subscription.”133 In some cases, courts indulge in a fiction that 
the charity’s agreement to use the future contributions for charitable 
purposes provides consideration;134 this is questionable because the 
charities generally have a pre-existing duty to use their funds for 
charitable purposes.135 Other times, courts adopt the fiction that the 
promises of other donors to contribute constitute consideration to 
enforce each donation;136 this is dubious as any private benefit from 
the donations of others seems very speculative.137 Courts also turn to 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce charitable pledges138
and may allow charities to enforce pledges under promissory 
estoppel when the charity cannot prove all the usual elements.139
 133. See King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 n.3 (observing 
that the terms charitable “subscription” and charitable “pledge” frequently are used 
interchangeably).  
 134. See, e.g., In re Morton Shoe Co., 40 B.R. 948, 951 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1984) (“The pledge document . . . clearly indicates that by accepting the subscription 
[the charity] agrees to apply the pledged amounts in accordance with the charitable 
purposes set forth in its charter. This is sufficient consideration to support the 
promise.”); Neb. Wesleyan Univ. v. Estate of Couch (In re Estate of Couch), 103 
N.W.2d 274, 276 (Neb. 1960) (finding consideration because the donor pledged 
$5,000 for scholarships for “worthy girls”); Cent. Me. Gen. Hosp. v. Carter, 132 A. 
417, 420 (Me. 1926). 
 135. A charity is obligated to use its resources for charitable purposes under 
both state law and federal tax law. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 67-68 (11th ed. 2016) (“An organization is organized 
exclusively for one or more tax-exempt, charitable purposes only if its articles of 
organization limit its purposes to one or more exempt purposes . . . .”). If a party 
already has an obligation to perform an action, an agreement to perform that action 
is not consideration for contract law purposes under the pre-existing duty rule. 
PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 213 (“The pre-existing duty rule [is] 
conceptually grounded on the idea that no promise is binding unless it is paid for by 
bargained-for detriment.”); see Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899 
(6th Cir. 2006).  
 136. See 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:40, at 280-83 nn.1-9 (4th ed. 2013) (listing nine sets of 
cases supporting this view). 
 137. See, e.g., Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 486-87 (Fla. 
1974) (holding pledge unenforceable even though pledge document stated it was 
made in consideration of the pledges of others); I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 
12 N.E.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 1938) (“It is unquestioned that the request that other 
subscribers make contributions, . . . stated as a consideration in the subscription 
agreement, is not consideration.”).  
 138. See, e.g., King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995). 
See generally Budig et al., supra note 91, at 53 n.14 (citing Trs. of Farmington 
Acad. v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172, 175-76 (1817)). 
 139. The American Law Institute (ALI) endorses relaxing the requirements 
for charities. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
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Thus, despite the general maxim that mere promises to give in the 
future are not legally enforceable, in the charitable arena, courts 
typically twist the rules to enforce charitable pledges whether or not 
the charity will grant naming rights in exchange for the donation.  
2. Unconditional Completed Gifts 
If a transaction satisfies all the elements for a valid gift,140
including delivery and acceptance, then the gift is enforceable and 
the donor cannot revoke it. Courts and commentators say a 
completed gift is enforceable like a contract.141 Thus, once the donor 
delivers the cash or property and the charity accepts, generally the 
donor cannot recover his or her donation, or obtain any other 
remedy, in the absence of fraud, undue influence, or similar 
conditions.142
As a result, if the donor does not secure his or her rights to 
name before or simultaneously with delivering the cash or 
property,143 under the law of gifts, generally the charity need not 
grant naming rights. The very sad case of Courts v. Annie Penn 
Memorial Hospital, Inc.144 demonstrates this legal principle and the 
attendant risks for donors.  
1981) (“[R]eliance need not be of [a] substantial character.”); see Salsbury v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974) (adopting the ALI 
approach).  
 140. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (listing the elements for 
a valid gift). 
 141. See 38A C.J.S. § 1 (2008) (citing Wilson v. Fackrell, 34 P.2d 409, 412-
13 (Idaho 1934)) (“[E]very perfected gift may be regarded as an executed contract, 
. . . and, where no rights of creditors intervene to affect its validity, such a 
transaction stands on the same footing as contracts founded on a valuable 
consideration”). 
 142. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 75 (2010) (“If a gift has been obtained by 
fraud or undue influence, an action may be brought to rescind or set aside the 
transaction.”). Remedies would be available if the other elements for a valid gift are 
not satisfied, such as if the donor lacks capacity. See supra notes 104-10 and 
accompanying text (listing the elements for a valid gift). Most important, the donor 
may recover the gift if it was subject to a condition subsequent that the charity failed 
to fulfill. See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
 143. If the donation is beneficial, the charity’s acceptance can be presumed. 
See 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 31 (“An acceptance will be presumed where the gift is 
beneficial to the donee.”). 
 144. 431 S.E.2d 864, 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that donor made 
an unconditional gift when donee accepted the property before donor stated that she 
intended for the gift to be subject to conditions). 
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Ms. Julia Courts grew up in Reidsville, North Carolina, and 
admired her grandfather who was a surgeon and prominent member 
of the Reidsville community.145 Once she started working in 1927, 
Ms. Courts invested her excess earnings in the stock market and 
planned to someday donate her wealth to the Annie Penn Memorial 
Hospital located in Reidsville in honor of her grandfather.146 After 
saving for over sixty years, Ms. Courts donated her stock to the 
Hospital by endorsing the stock certificates and mailing them 
directly to the Hospital’s President.147 Unfortunately, Ms. Courts 
failed to include with the stock certificates any direction that the 
hospital must acknowledge the service of her grandfather as a 
condition of the gift. The Hospital’s President accepted the gift of the 
stock certificates immediately upon receipt. Although Ms. Courts 
subsequently told the Hospital President and other representatives 
that she donated “in honor of or to honor her family,”148 the Hospital 
ultimately decided that it would provide absolutely no recognition to 
Ms. Courts, her grandfather, or any other member of her family.149
The Hospital indicated no reason for not providing any type of 
recognition other than that it never agreed to recognize the gift.150
The North Carolina Court of Appeals referred to the “callousness”151
of the Hospital representatives and commiserated with Ms. Courts 
 145. Id. at 864. 
 146. Id.
 147. Id. at 864-65. Ms. Courts planned to leave the stock to the Hospital in 
her will, but she decided to donate during her life when she learned that a private 
investor intended to purchase the stock of a company in which she was invested 
heavily. Id. at 864. Although not stated by the court, perhaps the outside investor’s 
acquisition would have triggered a substantial capital gains tax for Ms. Courts. 
Donors frequently contribute substantially appreciated property to charity, rather 
than cash, to avoid the capital gains tax. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE TAX LAW OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING 146 (3d ed. 2005) (“One of the chief principles underlying 
(and creating) the advantages of charitable contributions of securities . . . [is that] the 
amount of appreciation in the property, . . . which would be taxed as capital gain if 
the property were sold, escapes regular income taxation.”); see also JOEL S.
NEWMAN & DOROTHY A. BROWN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 600 (6th ed. 
2016).
 148. Courts, 431 S.E.2d at 865. 
 149. Id. at 865-66 (explaining that Ms. Courts requested that the Hospital 
name its foundation after her family, and the Hospital declined). But see id. at 865 
(noting some area newspapers ran stories about the substantial donation and the 
family’s history in Reidsville). 
 150. Id. at 867 (stating “the Hospital did not explain to Ms. Courts in detail” 
its naming policy for its foundation or that Ms. Courts could establish “within the 
foundation a lasting endowment . . . in the Courts family name”). 
 151. Id.
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who “had unselfishly donated her life’s savings to the Hospital.”152
Although Ms. Courts may have found some solace in the appeals 
court’s stern words toward the Hospital, ultimately the court 
concluded that under the law of gifts there was no remedy the court 
could provide. The appeals court noted that even if the donor 
intended to obtain naming rights, “any ‘undisclosed intention is 
immaterial in the absence of mistake, fraud, and the like.’”153 Once 
the Hospital accepted the stock certificates, the gift was complete, 
and “‘after-the-fact’ conditions are not recognized by the law . . . 
[and] to allow conditions to attach later would put the donee in a 
position fraught with uncertainty regarding his or her rights to the 
property received.”154 As discussed later, the court might have had 
some options if it had applied contract law rather than the law of 
gifts.155
3. Conditional Gifts 
A valid gift must vest title to the donated property in the 
donee.156 Nevertheless, a valid gift can be subject to a condition 
subsequent157 so that if the condition is not satisfied the gift will 
fail.158 A typical gift with a condition subsequent arises if the donor 
transfers title to the property and simultaneously limits the donee’s 
“use of the [property] to a particular purpose and provide[s] that title 
will revert to the donor if the use for the special purpose ceases.”159
If the donee fails to satisfy the condition subsequent, the 
donor’s remedy is “limited to a recovery of the gift.”160 This creates 
an extreme, all-or-nothing situation, where either the donee keeps the 
gift or the gift reverts to the donor. Perhaps because the results are so 
extreme, one court has stated that “conditions must be created by 
express terms or by clear implication and are construed strictly.”161
The donor’s mere hopes or expectations are insufficient to create a 
 152. Id.
 153. Id. at 866 (quoting Howell v. Smith, 128 S.E.2d 144, 146 (N.C. 1962)). 
 154. Id. at 868. 
 155. See infra notes 524-33 and accompanying text (discussing the definition 
of an “offer” and the ability of a court to supply omitted terms). 
 156. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 38 (2008). 
 157. Id. § 39.  
 158. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 67 (2010); Courts, 431 S.E.2d at 866. 
 159. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 67.  
 160. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 38. 
 161. Id. (citing Tenn. Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).  
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condition subsequent.162 In some situations, courts have refused to 
enforce oral conditions.163
In a factually complex charitable naming rights case, the court 
ultimately found that a division of the Daughters of the Confederacy 
made a conditional gift to a predecessor of Vanderbilt University.164
The convoluted facts included three gifting instruments and 
negotiations spanning almost twenty years. A division of the 
Daughters of the Confederacy wanted to sponsor a college or 
university dormitory where female descendants of Confederate 
soldiers could stay rent-free and pay other dormitory expenses at 
cost.165 In 1913, that division of the Daughters of the Confederacy 
entered into an agreement with a teachers college that ultimately 
would merge into Vanderbilt University. This first agreement 
provided in part that the Daughters would raise $50,000, which 
would cover the college’s entire anticipated construction cost for a 
dormitory. By 1927, the Daughters had not even raised $18,000, but 
at that time they entered into a second agreement with the teachers 
college under which the Daughters contributed slightly less than 
$18,000 to the teachers college. The teachers college agreed to invest 
the funds at interest, but the teachers college would return the 
amount if the Daughters of the Confederacy “decided to recall [the 
money].”166
Finally, in 1933, the Daughters of the Confederacy had raised 
the $50,000, but by that time all parties agreed that $150,000 would 
be needed to build the dormitory. In a 1933 document, the Daughters 
donated approximately $32,000 (to reach the $50,000 goal), and the 
teachers college agreed to build the dormitory if a government 
agency called the National Recovery Administration would provide 
the extra $100,000 needed. The teachers college also agreed that it 
would “place on the [dorm] an inscription naming it ‘Confederate 
Memorial.’”167 This third document “explicitly stated that it was ‘the 
 162. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 67. 
 163. See, e.g., State v. Thom, 563 P.2d 982 (Haw. 1977). But see Martinez v. 
Martinez, 678 P.2d 1163 (N.M. 1984) (enforcing an alleged oral condition). When 
engagement rings are involved, however, some courts have been willing to imply a 
condition that the donee must return the ring if the parties do not marry. See, e.g.,
Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999); Cooper v. Smith, 800 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2003). But see Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 720 (Mont. 2002).  
 164. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 165. Id. at 104. 
 166. Id.
 167. Id. at 105. 
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intention of the parties that this contract shall be void and of no 
effect in case [the additional funding] is not obtained from said 
National Recovery Administration.’”168 The National Recovery 
Administration never provided the additional $100,000; instead the 
teachers college paid the final $100,000 to make the dormitory 
construction possible.169
The dormitory opened in 1935 with the words “‘Confederate 
Memorial Hall’ in incised lettering on the pediment on the front of 
the building.”170 From 1935 until the late 1970s, female descendants 
of Confederate soldiers lived in the dormitory rent-free and paid 
“other dormitory expenses on an estimated cost basis.”171 In 1979, the 
teachers college merged into Vanderbilt University.172 In 1983, 
Vanderbilt ended the practice of leasing rent-free and allowing 
expenses to be paid at cost.
In 1987 and 1988, “Vanderbilt spent approximately $2.5 
million to renovate and upgrade Confederate Memorial Hall,”173 and 
apparently the Daughters of the Confederacy contributed nothing to 
the cost of that renovation. After paying $2.5 million for the 
renovation and upgrade, certain University officials and the 
Vanderbilt University Student Government Association began 
discussing the “propriety of retaining” the word “Confederate” in the 
name of the dormitory.174 In connection with these conversations 
about the impact of the word “Confederate,”175 the University 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. (explaining that the National Recovery Administration denied the 
request because the teachers college “was not a ‘public body’”).  
 170. Id.
 171. Id. at 104-05. 
 172. Id. at 106. 
 173. Id.
 174. Id. at 106-07. The court summarized the positions as follows: 
According to Vanderbilt, the maintenance of the inscription on the 
pediment of Confederate Memorial Hall forces Vanderbilt to send a 
message of racial hatred and exclusion that it no longer wishes to send. 
According to the Tennessee [Daughters of the Confederacy], the 
inscription is not a symbol of racial intolerance and oppression, and 
Vanderbilt’s decision to remove it is nothing less than an attempt to 
rewrite history in a manner that demeans its members’ ancestors. 
Id. at 120. 
 175. In response to the discussions after the renovation, Vanderbilt 
University’s Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt issued a statement “announcing that he was 
not inclined to recommend renaming Confederate Memorial Hall based on the 
historical information currently available and because of ‘the absence of any 
indication that the naming . . . was in any sense intended to support either slavery or 
any other form of prejudice toward Blacks.’” Id. at 107.  
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installed a plaque at the entrance to the dormitory explaining the 
motivations for the name but did not change the name of the 
dormitory at that time.176 Eventually, in 2002, a new chancellor of 
Vanderbilt University announced that the word “Confederate” would 
be stricken, the name of the dormitory would change to “Memorial 
Hall,” and the University reflected the change on its maps, website, 
and correspondence.177
The division of the Daughters of the Confederacy sued for 
breach of contract.178 The trial court held for Vanderbilt University, 
in part because the 1933 document was the only one that required the 
“Confederate” name on the dormitory, and the 1933 document was 
void according to its express terms because the National Recovery 
Administration failed to provide the $100,000 in construction 
funds.179
On appeal, the court rejected contract law and chose to apply 
the law of gifts.180 The court stated that although each of the three 
documents between the parties used the word “contract,”181 the court 
was not bound by isolated statements and instead would analyze all 
the language of the documents, the actions of the donor, and the 
relationship of the parties to determine whether the donor had the 
requisite intent to make a gift.182 In finding that the arrangement was 
a conditional gift, the court stated, “[T]he plain language of the three 
agreements . . . repeatedly describes the $50,000 . . . as a ‘gift’”183
 176. Id. at 107 & n.11 (reproducing a draft version of the inscription on the 
plaque stating in part that the Daughters of the Confederacy contributed funds to 
construct the dormitory “in memory of their fathers and brothers who fought in the 
War between North and South, 1861–65”).  
 177. Id. at 107-08. 
 178. Id. at 109. 
 179. Id. at 110. 
 180. In rejecting the law of contracts, the court stated, “[The agreements] do 
not purport to establish a typical commercial arrangement in which one party 
provides certain goods or services in return for a sum to be paid by the other party.” 
Id. at 112. Nevertheless, the court went on to mention that certain aspects of its 
analysis were consistent with contract law. See id. at 118 (stating that “[t]he courts 
do not concern themselves with the wisdom or folly of a contract” in response to 
concerns about enforcing the requirement that Vanderbilt use the term 
“Confederate” to keep the gift). 
 181. Id. at 112.  
 182. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (regarding the intent to 
make a gift). 
 183. Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 112. For example, the 
1913 document was labeled “Contract,” but the document specifically stated it was 
intended “to evidence . . . ‘the conditions which will be attached to the gift.’” Id. at 
104 (emphasis added). 
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and noted that the charitable status of the college “suggests the 
possibility of a donative intent on the part of the [Daughters of the 
Confederacy].”184
The court stated that any conditions to a gift “must be created 
by express terms or by clear implication and are construed 
strictly.”185 Based on the documents, the court found three conditions 
to the gift: (i) that the college must use the $50,000 towards the 
construction of a dormitory; (ii) that the college allow female 
descendants of Confederate soldiers to live rent-free in the dorm; and 
(iii) that there must be “an inscription naming the [dorm] 
‘Confederate Memorial.’”186 The court found that Vanderbilt 
University and its predecessor satisfied the naming conditions for 
over sixty-five years, but Vanderbilt would fail if it removed the 
word “Confederate” as it threatened to do in 2002.  
The court held that if Vanderbilt removed the word 
“Confederate” from the building’s pediment, it would have to repay 
the Daughters the $50,000 original donation, plus an additional 
amount based on the change in the consumer price index,187 which 
would amount to approximately $700,000.188 Initially, Vanderbilt 
avoided paying the money by leaving the inscription above the 
dormitory doors but deleting all references to “Confederate” when 
referring to the building.189 In 2016, however, Vanderbilt announced 
that it would remove the word “Confederate” from the building’s 
pediment and pay the Daughters $1.2 million.190
The court chose not to treat the arrangement as a charitable 
trust, stating, “A donating party will be deemed to have created a 
 184. Id. at 112. 
 185. Id. at 115. 
 186. Id. at 116. 
 187. Id. at 119. 
 188. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides an online calculator using the 
“average Consumer Price Index for a given calendar year.” About the CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
[https:/perma.cc/Z78h-XZNC] (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (determining that $50,000 
in 1933 has the purchasing power of $751,153.85 in 2005); see also R. WILSON
FREYERMUTH, JEROME M. ORGAN & ALICE M. NOBLE-ALLGIRE, PROPERTY AND 
LAWYERING 218 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that the amount was $700,000). 
 189. Scott Jaschik, Lost Cause at Vanderbilt, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13, 
2005, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/07/13/vandy [https:// 
perma.cc/NS7F-5XYY]. 
 190. Anderson, supra note 3. 
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trust only if the party has expressed with certainty its intent to create 
a trust.”191
4. All-or-Nothing Remedy  
In the case of a conditional gift, a court’s ability to redress a 
problem is severely limited. For example, in the Daughters of the 
Confederacy case, the court stated that if Vanderbilt failed to satisfy 
the condition, the gift would fail, and the only remedy was for the 
gift to revert back to the Daughters of the Confederacy.192 In that 
circumstance, in 2005, the court would award the Daughters of the 
Confederacy approximately $750,000.193 As Vanderbilt University 
pointed out, multiple facts strongly indicated this recovery was 
disproportionate to any harm caused to the Daughters of the 
Confederacy or to any wrongdoing on Vanderbilt’s part. The 
Daughters of the Confederacy contributed only $50,000 in 1933 
toward the construction of a dormitory that cost $150,000.194 Female 
descendants of Confederate soldiers stayed rent-free in the dorm 
from 1935 through 1983 and paid only cost for certain dormitory 
charges.195 The dorm was named “Confederate Memorial Hall” for 
over sixty-five years, and the Daughters of the Confederacy 
apparently contributed nothing when Vanderbilt spent $2.5 million to 
renovate the dorm in 1987 and 1988.  
The Tennessee Court of Appeals stated that “where a donee 
fails or ceases to comply with the conditions of a gift, the donor’s 
remedy is limited to recovery of the gift.”196 The court found that 
because “the value of a dollar today is very different from the value 
of a dollar in 1933 . . . the amount Vanderbilt must pay to the 
[Daughters of the Confederacy] . . . to return the gift should be based 
on the consumer price index.”197 In rejecting Vanderbilt University’s 
argument to reduce the damage award for the value of the free rent 
and the naming rights enjoyed by the Daughters for over sixty-five 
 191. Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 113. 
 192. Id. at 119; see generally 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 38 (2016). 
 193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 194. See also Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 104.  
 195. Id. at 106. 
 196. Id. at 119. 
 197. Id. (reasoning that the index should be based on figures “published by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor”). 
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years, the Tennessee Appeals Court summarily stated that the 
calculation of that amount would be “impermissibly speculative.”198
Apparently appreciating the potential harshness of this 
approach, at least one court has attempted to introduce some 
discretion. In St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. v. McCarthy,199 an 
Indiana court indicated, in dicta, that a condition to a gift could be 
satisfied by “substantial” compliance even though the charity, at 
some point, fails to comply with the condition.200
In the St. Mary’s case, under her will, Cornelia Haney 
indirectly donated approximately $250,000 to St. Mary’s Hospital 
“for the purpose of creating . . . a Haney Memorial.”201 The court 
indicated this declaration of purpose might not constitute a 
“condition,”202 but the court discussed the results if this created a 
condition.203 The Hospital used the money to construct a chapel in 
1956 with a plaque stating that it was a memorial to Cornelia Haney. 
In 2003, the Hospital determined that to expand its medical facilities 
it needed to demolish the chapel.204 A distant family member sought 
an injunction, and the trial court likely applied some traditional gift 
rules because it concluded that the hospital must “do nothing that 
might hasten the chapel’s demise and that [the hospital must] wait 
until the chapel crumble[s] of its own accord” perhaps in another 
fifty to seventy-five years.205 On appeal, the court held that even if 
Haney made a conditional gift, the Hospital had substantially
complied with the condition because the Hospital publicized the 
 198. Id.
 199. 829 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 200. See id. at 1077. In the case of a trust, a failure to literally comply with a 
condition may be excused under the doctrine of cy pres. See Allison Anna Tait, 
Publicity Rules for Public Trusts, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421, 447-48 
(2015).
 201. St. Mary’s, 829 N.E.2d at 1071. Haney donated the money for the 
benefit of the hospital and instructed a committee to designate how the hospital 
could use the donation.  
 202. Cornelia Haney made the gift under her will, and in these circumstances 
the court stated “the clear majority rule is ‘that nothing short of express provisions 
for forfeiture and either a reverter, a gift over or a right to retake . . . would enable a 
donor to effectively impose a condition subsequent.’” Id. at 1076. 
 203. See id. at 1077 (noting that “even if there was a . . . valid condition 
subsequent, St. Mary’s use of the chapel for nearly fifty years represents substantial 
compliance with any such . . . condition” (emphasis added)). 
 204. Id.
 205. Id. at 1077 n.4. 
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Haney name for almost fifty years with the plaque at the chapel.206
The appeals court specifically noted that the Hospital owned the land 
under the chapel; the Haney contribution merely built the chapel, and 
the Hospital likely did not anticipate its land would be occupied for 
approximately one hundred and twenty-five years when it accepted 
the Haney gift.207
The Indiana court’s use of a substantial compliance standard, 
even in dicta, may provide courts using the gift rules with a bit more 
flexibility. Nevertheless, it still leaves courts with only an all-or-
nothing option. If the donee–charity complies (or perhaps 
substantially complies), there is absolutely no remedy at all for the 
donor. On the other hand, if the donee–charity fails to comply (or 
fails to substantially comply), then the entire gift must revert back to 
the donor even if the donor enjoyed substantial benefits before the 
charity failed.  
B. Contract Law: Can a Charitable Donation Be a Contract? 
This Article asserts that donors and charities may find more 
predictability by structuring naming rights transactions as contracts, 
rather than as gifts, and courts may reach more reasonable results 
when disputes arise by applying the law of contracts rather than the 
law of gifts. But is there any authority for treating charitable 
contributions as contracts? 
A court has stated that granting naming rights or other public 
recognition does not prevent a transfer from being a charitable 
contribution.208 This conclusion seems sound for substantial 
contributions because the normal “ask amount” for a charitable 
naming gift is 50% of the cost of the item named,209 and commercial 
firms typically pay only 10% to 20% of the cost of a professional 
sports stadium or arena for naming rights.210
 206. Id. at 1077 (relying on Indiana cases suggesting that compliant use for 
nearly fifty years constitutes substantial compliance). 
 207. Id. at 1077 n.4 (questioning whether the hospital understood that it was 
“tying up a substantial piece of its grounds for at least 100 to 125 years when it 
agreed to use the funds from Haney’s estate to build the chapel”). 
 208. Id. at 1073 n.2 (“It is well-settled that a gift does not lose its charitable 
character simply because the donor also wants the gift to be recognized as a personal 
or family memorial.”). 
 209. BURTON, supra note 19, at 142. 
 210. See Drennan, supra note 21, at 94-96. 
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The analysis to determine if a charitable contribution could be a 
contract can begin with the fundamentals. Parties create a contract211
with (i) an offer and (ii) an acceptance, (iii) supported by 
consideration.212 The search for the offer and the acceptance in a 
charitable naming rights arrangement can be challenging, and the 
potential questions involving consideration are multifaceted and 
existential.213
1. Offer and Acceptance: Bargaining Over Generosity and 
Praise
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement”) 
provides working definitions of “offer” and “acceptance.” An offer is 
a “manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain” that invites 
acceptance and is intended to conclude negotiations.214 An 
acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer in the manner 
invited by the offeror.215 When the promisor has made an offer, and 
the promisee accepts, there is mutual assent.216
A number of cases categorize certain charitable naming 
arrangements as contracts rather than gifts. Generally, these cases 
find that the donor made the offer when pledging217 to donate, and 
the charity accepted either when it verbally assented, when it 
retained the first pledge payment, or when it incurred liabilities based 
on the pledge.  
A bilateral contract arises if the offeror allows his or her 
promise to be accepted by a return promise, and the offeree accepts 
by promising to perform.218 For example, the donor and the charity 
may sign a letter agreement specifying when the donor will make a 
series of donations, how the charity will use the money donated, the 
 211. In general, a contract is a set of promises if the law recognizes the 
performance as a duty, and the law grants a remedy for a breach. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 212. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 23, 151. 
 213. See Cozzillio, supra note 23, at 1335 (stressing that without 
consideration there is no enforceable contract). 
 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24. 
 215. Id. § 50. 
 216. Id. § 17. 
 217. A pledge is a promise to make a series of donations to a charity over 
time. See King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1204 (Mass. 1995). The 
terms “charitable pledge” and “charitable subscription” are interchangeable. See id.
at 1199 n.3.  
 218. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 57. 
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details of the naming arrangement, and other terms.219 In contrast, a 
unilateral contract arises when an offeror allows acceptance by actual 
performance, and the offeree accepts by performing.220 As a classic 
example, if I publicly post an offer to pay $300 to anyone who finds 
and returns my lost dog to me, I have made an offer for a unilateral 
contract.221 I am bargaining for the return of my lost dog, not for a 
mere promise to find and return my dog. Courts in charitable naming 
rights cases may find either (i) a bilateral contract or (ii) a unilateral 
contract.
a. Bilateral Contracts 
Justice Cardozo’s landmark opinion in Allegheny College
concludes that the charitable naming rights arrangement was a 
bilateral contract.222 In Allegheny College, the College launched a 
drive to raise $1.25 million, and the appeal eventually reached Mary 
Yates Johnston. Johnston signed a document called an “estate 
pledge” stating her estate would pay the College $5,000 within thirty 
days after her death.223 The pledge was subject to the requirements 
that the College retain the donated amount in a separate fund, 
publicize it as the “Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund,” and use it 
for scholarships for ministry students.224 Although she had not 
promised to donate during her life, Johnston contributed $1,000 to 
the College toward the pledge. Later, she repudiated her pledge to 
donate the balance.225
When Johnston’s estate failed to pay within thirty days of her 
death, the College sued the executor of her estate for the $4,000 
balance. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, held for the 
 219. See, e.g., Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 442 P.2d 93, 96 (Ariz. 
1968).
 220. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 50 (2d ed. 
2009).
 221. See Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: 
Practical Jokes, Prizes, and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 550 (2003); see also
PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 67. 
 222. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 
(N.Y. 1927) (concluding that the charity’s agreement to provide naming rights was 
consideration to support a bilateral contract); see Cozzillio, supra note 23, at 1336 
(referring to Allegheny College as a “landmark” opinion).  
 223. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 174. 
 224. Id. (specifying that the school was to use the funds “to educate students 
preparing for the ministry, either in the United States or in the Foreign Field”). 
 225. Id.
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College and concluded that the pledge was a bilateral contract.226 In 
identifying the offer and acceptance, Justice Cardozo wrote that after 
Johnston pledged to donate, then “[t]he moment that the college 
accepted $1,000 as a payment on account there was an assumption of 
a duty . . . to maintain the . . . spirit of its creation.”227 In other words, 
there was a bilateral contract because Johnston, in writing, offered to 
donate in exchange for the College’s promise to name the fund after 
Johnston and use the money for the specified scholarships, and the 
College’s act of retaining her $1,000 donation was an implied 
promise to comply with her terms involving contributions totaling 
$5,000.228 Several commentators question Justice Cardozo’s 
approach in Allegheny College.229 Nevertheless, Allegheny College
clearly concludes that a charitable naming rights arrangement can be 
a contract. 
In Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church of Wickenburg, the 
Church’s pastor invited parishioner S. Judson Dunaway to make a 
presentation on fundraising to the Church’s Building and Finance 
Committee to kick-start a campaign to build an annex for the 
Church’s Sunday school.230 At the end of the meeting, Dunaway 
stated that he and his wife would “‘start the ball rolling’ by a 
contribution of stock worth $10,000 to be applied to the construction 
of the [annex] and stipulat[ed] that there be a plaque ‘honoring 
Reverend and Mrs. Poling.’”231 The Dunaways contributed the stock, 
and the Church’s pastor, Reverend Poling, promptly transferred the 
stock to the Church treasurer.232 Soon, the Reverend Poling resigned 
as pastor. Approximately one year after the transfer of stock, church 
officials wrote and asked the Dunaways if the Church could use 
 226. Id. at 176. 
 227. Id. at 175. 
 228. Id.
 229. See supra note 23; see also Cunningham, supra note 23, at 1403 n.131 
(asserting that “Cardozo’s treatment of the contract as bilateral . . . was necessary to 
respond to [Judge] Kellogg’s dissent”). But see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny 
College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 149, 150, 152 (2005) (observing, “[A]lmost everyone complains 
about the opinion,” but Professor Bridgeman defends Justice Cardozo’s approach, 
stating, “Cardozo was . . . applying [the doctrine of consideration] in a way that 
respected both how the parties likely understood the transaction themselves and how 
parties typically understand [charitable naming rights] transactions”). 
 230. 442 P.2d 93, 94 (Ariz. 1968) (concluding that a charitable pledge was a 
bilateral contract when the charity accepted the donated property). 
 231. Id.
 232. Id.
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$8,000 of the contribution to purchase real estate across the street, 
rather than build a Sunday school annex.  
The Dunaways refused and sued to recover the stock arguing 
that the Church could only use the donation to build a Sunday school 
annex “as a memorial for the Reverend Poling.”233 After observing 
that “the law in this [area] is neither uniform nor well settled,”234 the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated “where the gift has passed into the 
hands of the donee, there is an implied promise agreeing to the 
purposes for which it is offered from the acceptance of the donation 
and there arises a bilateral contract supported by a valuable 
consideration.”235 Specifically in regards to acceptance, the Court 
stated, “[T]he Church, by exercising dominion over the stock, 
assented to the conditions of the donation and is bound both in law 
and in good conscience to perform the conditions or to return the 
stock and dividends.”236 The Court concluded that unless the Church 
uses the donation to build the annex with a plaque honoring the 
Reverend Poling within a reasonable time, it must return the stock 
and all intervening dividends to the Dunaways.237
In Stock v. Augsburg College, Augsburg College solicited 
donations for its 21st Century Fund to raise $25 million.238 The 
campaign brochure said, “Named gift opportunities are numerous.”239
After some negotiations with alumnus Elroy Stock, a College 
representative sent a letter to Stock recognizing Stock’s “right to 
designate . . . the ‘Elroy Stock Communications Wing’” in a new 
building in anticipation of a $500,000 donation.240 Subsequently, the 
College’s Board of Regents voted to name the wing after Elroy 
Stock, and Stock donated the $500,000.  
Shortly thereafter, news outlets reported that Stock had 
conducted a racist letter-writing campaign.241 The College’s Board of 
 233. Id.
 234. Id. at 95.  
 235. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. 
Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927), and eight other cases). 
 236. Id. at 96 (discussing as authority RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 72(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1932), stating that exercising “dominion in the 
absence of other circumstances showing a contrary intention is an acceptance”). 
 237. Id. at 96. 
 238. No. C1-01-1673, 2002 WL 555944, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 
2002).
 239. Id. at *6.  
 240. Id. at *1.  
 241. Id. at *2 (“Following a . . . news report that exposed [Stock’s racist] 
letter-writing campaign, there was a great deal of unfavorable publicity about 
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Regents voted to keep Stock’s $500,000 donation and use it to build 
the new wing, but they also voted not to name the new 
Communications Wing after Stock. Instead, the Regents chose to 
name it the Foss-Lobeck-Miles Center.242
Eventually, Elroy Stock sued for breach of contract seeking to 
recover the $500,000. The court did not expressly state whether the 
arrangement was a bilateral or unilateral contract. Nevertheless, in 
concluding that there was a contact and that the College breached the 
contract by failing to name the wing after Stock, the court stated the 
“[College] promised to name the wing after [Elroy Stock] in 
exchange for [his] $500,000 donation.”243 The court’s focus on the 
College’s promise to name indicates that Stock made an offer for a 
bilateral contract, which the College accepted by its promise to name 
the building after Stock. Ultimately, Stock was unable to recover his 
donation because the statute of limitations on a contract action 
expired before he filed the lawsuit.244
b. Unilateral Contracts 
Paul & Irene Bogoni Foundation v. St. Bonaventure University 
is a naming rights case in which the court found an offer to create a 
unilateral contract and an acceptance of that offer.245 After 
discussions with a University representative, the Bogonis executed 
two documents each titled “Gift Commitment.”246 Under the first Gift 
Commitment document, the Bogonis pledged to contribute $1.5 
million over sixteen months to establish and support a new Bogoni 
Center for Gerontology Studies at the University.247 Under the second 
[Stock],” and “[t]he publicity included articles about . . . his ties to Augsburg 
[College], his large contribution, and Augsburg’s intent to name a wing of the 
building after [Stock].”).  
 242. Id. at *4. 
 243. Id. (emphasis added). 
 244. Id. (concluding that the naming arrangement was an enforceable 
contract, but the donor failed to sue to enforce his naming rights within the statute of 
limitations period for a contract action).  
 245. Paul & Irene Bogoni Found. v. St. Bonaventure Univ., No. 102095/08, 
2009 WL 6318140, at 11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2009) (concluding that the 
donors’ promise to contribute and the charity’s expenditure of donated funds created 
a unilateral contract). 
 246. Id. at 2-3. The foundations established by the Bogonis were likely the 
actual parties of many of the actions, see id. at 5 n.1, but for ease of reference, this 
discussion refers to the individuals rather than the foundations. 
 247. After signing the Gift Commitment, a few days later the Bogonis signed 
an “Endowment Agreement” specifying the name as The Paul and Irene Bogoni 
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Gift Commitment document, the Bogonis pledged to contribute $2 
million248 over nineteen months to construct the “Paul and Irene 
Bogoni Library Addition,”249 which would house the University’s 
rare books collection.  
The Bogonis paid approximately $2.6 million total, but they 
refused to pay the final $900,000 of the library addition pledge.250
The Bogonis complained about the University’s use of the funds and 
sued for specific performance. The Bogonis asked the court to 
enforce the terms of the arrangement, or alternatively, require that 
the University return all amounts to the Bogonis or pay those 
amounts into the court. The University moved for summary 
judgment asserting entitlement to the $900,000 balance of the 
pledge.251 Although the parties captioned the original documents 
“Gift Commitments,”252 the court indicated the Bogonis made offers 
for unilateral contracts. In effect, the court found that the Bogonis 
offered to donate but only if the charity performed.253
Based on the evidence, the court determined that the University 
properly established the Bogoni Center for Gerontology Studies, 
would name the library addition for the Bogonis when it received the 
final $900,000,254 and incurred liability debts in reliance on the 
donors’ pledges.255 The court quoted with approval an earlier case 
that “[i]t is the well established law of this State that charitable 
subscriptions (pledges) are enforceable . . . [as] an offer of a 
unilateral contract which, when accepted by the charity by incurring 
liability in reliance thereon, becomes a binding obligation.”256 Thus, 
the court found acceptance because the University spent money to 
GRACE Project, with GRACE serving as an acronym for Gerontology Research, 
Academic Preparation, and Community Enrichment. Id. at 2-3. 
 248. Id. at 4-5. The original pledge for the library addition was $1.5 million, 
and the Bogonis later increased the pledge to $2 million. Id.
 249. Id. at 5. Other documents indicated the name would be “The Paul and 
Irene Bogoni Rare Books Library.” See id. at 15 n.2. 
 250. Id. at 8-9. 
 251. Id. at 11.  
 252. Id. at 4. 
 253. Id. at 11-17. 
 254. Id. at 11. At the time of trial, the parties failed to clearly state the name 
of the library addition. In any event, the court declined to treat the University as 
failing to meet its naming obligation, presumably because if the University had not 
already named the addition after the Bogonis, it would once the Bogonis fulfilled the 
pledge. Id. at 15 n.2. 
 255. Id. at 11-17. 
 256. Id. at 12 (quoting Cohoes Mem’l Hosp. v. Mossey, 25 A.D.2d 476 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966)). 
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build the library addition. The court in Bogoni relied heavily on an 
earlier case, Woodmere Academy, in concluding this was a unilateral 
contract.257
In Woodmere Academy,258 the Academy solicited pledges in 
1969 to build a new school library. Later that year, a donor executed 
a formal printed pledge for $375,000 payable in installments before 
January 1, 1973. By December 1972, the donor had paid only 
$50,000, and on December 12, 1972, both the Academy and the 
donor signed a letter “in the nature of an agreement” calling for 
$125,000 payable immediately and $200,000 payable December 31, 
1973.259 The letter agreement stated in part that “[i]n recognition of 
your concern and interest . . . our library . . . has been named” for 
your spouse.260 The donor paid the $125,000 promptly but failed to 
pay the final $200,000. The Academy sued for the $200,000 balance. 
The court found that the December 12, 1972 letter was a “binding 
agreement” and quoted two prior cases for the conclusion that “such 
subscriptions are enforceable on the ground that they constitute an 
offer of a unilateral contract which, when accepted by the charity by 
incurring liability in reliance thereon, becomes a binding 
obligation.”261 On appeal, the court affirmed but did not address 
whether the contract was bilateral or unilateral.262
A commentator describing a 2014 case provides a very succinct 
and practical summary of this unilateral contract approach. 
[T]he pledge was ostensibly made in furtherance of a fundraising 
campaign, so it must be examined under the theory of a unilateral contract. 
Thus, the pledge would not become binding until the charity had 
sufficiently acted upon the pledge so as to incur liability . . . . This would 
include starting construction, employing architects and paying for plans, 
raising additional pledges based upon the disputed pledge, or taking on a 
construction loan for the project. The donor’s partial payment of the 
pledge, whether alone or in conjunction with concrete action on the part of 
 257. Id. at 12-14. Consistent with a contract approach, the court employed 
the parol evidence rule to ignore the Bogonis’ allegations that the charity agreed to 
other conditions not stated in the two Gift Commitment documents. Id.
 258. Woodmere Acad. v. Steinberg, 53 A.D.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), 
aff’d, 363 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding that the donor and the charity 
entered into a unilateral contract). 
 259. Id. at 157-58. 
 260. Id. at 158. 
 261. Id. at 159-60 (quoting I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 
532, 534 (N.Y. 1938); Cohoes Mem’l Hosp. v. Mossey, 25 A.D.2d 476, 476-77 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966)).  
 262. Woodmere Acad., 363 N.E.2d at 1172 (applying the parol evidence rule 
from general contract law). 
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the charity, has also been deemed sufficient to indicate acceptance of the 
unilateral contract.263
Based on the approach taken by the courts in these cases, it 
does not appear to make much difference whether a pledge 
agreement is a bilateral contract or a unilateral contract. Under the 
bilateral contract approach in Allegheny College, once the charity 
accepts one payment, the donor is contractually bound to make the 
remaining payments under the pledge, and the charity must name the 
property when the donor makes all the payments. Under the 
unilateral contract approach in Bogoni, once the charity incurs 
liabilities in reliance on the pledge, the donor must make the 
remaining pledge payments, and the charity must name the property 
when the donor makes all the pledge payments.  
2. When Is Public Recognition Consideration for a Promise to 
Donate? 
A foundational doctrine of contract law is the objective bargain 
theory of consideration.264 The following three-part test determines 
whether the parties’ mutual assent is supported by consideration 
under the doctrine: (i) the promisee must suffer a legal detriment,265
or the promisor (or a third party) must enjoy a legal benefit;266 (ii) the 
 263. Spencer L. Reames, In re Kramer and the Enforceability of Charitable 
Pledges, 87 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 24 (Jan. 2015). 
 264. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981); PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 152-53 (observing 
“[t]he essence of consideration . . . is legal detriment, that has been bargained for by 
the promisor, and exchanged by the promisee in return for the promisor’s promise,” 
and “[t]he idea of consideration ‘as a bargained-for exchange’ must be understood in 
the context of the objective theory of contracts”).  
 265. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 151. 
 266. There is ample authority that either a detriment or a benefit can serve as 
sufficient consideration; it is not necessary that the promisee’s detriment cause a 
benefit for the promisor. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) 
(“Consideration means not so much that one party is profiting as that the other 
abandons some legal right in the present, or limits his legal freedom of action in the 
future, as an inducement for the promise of the first”); Cozzillio, supra note 23, at 
1336 (stating that either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor is 
necessary for consideration, but not both); see also Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash 
Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (involving a situation in which 
the promisor enjoyed a benefit even though the promisee arguably did not suffer a 
detriment); PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 152 (indicating that the 
benefit may flow to a third party “so long as it is bargained for and given in 
exchange for the promise”).  
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detriment or benefit must induce the promise;267 and (iii) the promise 
must induce the detriment or benefit.268 A dense thicket of rules 
implement and supplement this three-part test. 
Technically, a thorough search for consideration in a bilateral 
contract requires a double analysis. Each party is a promisor, and 
each party is a promisee, and both promises must be supported by 
consideration.269 In the case of a typical bilateral charitable naming 
rights arrangement, however, there will be little doubt that the 
charity’s promise to name something after the donor is supported by 
the donor’s promise to transfer substantial cash or valuable property. 
As a result, this discussion of consideration will focus on whether the 
charity provides consideration to support the donor’s promise to 
contribute.  
a. Detriment, Benefit, Inducement, and Adequacy of 
Consideration
In general, the detriment to the promisee (the charity) includes 
a promise to do something the promisee (the charity) is not legally 
obligated to do, or to promise to refrain from doing something which 
the promisee (the charity) is legally entitled to do.270 In these 
transactions, the charity normally will make two kinds of promises 
that may constitute a detriment: (i) a publicity promise and (ii) a 
promise regarding the use of the contributed funds, such as for the 
construction of a new building.  
First, the promise to publicize, including the promise to name, 
can be a detriment because the charity is not otherwise legally 
 267. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 151. 
 268. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts avoids the term “detriment,” 
but it captures the concept by requiring a “performance or return promise,” and 
defining “performance” broadly to include “(a) an act . . . or (b) a forbearance, or (c) 
the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2)-(3). See PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, 
at 151 n.4 (noting that “[t]he difference . . . is not a difference of substance; rather, it 
is a difference in vocabulary”). 
 269. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 153 (noting that “in a 
bilateral contract there are two promisors”).  
 270. Id.; Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (“‘Consideration’ means not so much that 
one party is profiting as that the other abandons some legal right in the present, or 
limits his legal freedom of action in the future, as an inducement for the promise of 
the first [party].”). 
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obligated to publicize the donor’s name.271 The charity presumably 
will incur expenses in publicizing the donor’s name, such as 
engraving the donor’s name on the building, purchasing, engraving 
and installing a plaque, changing letterhead, commissioning and 
hanging a portrait, developing press releases or newsletters, and 
similar items. Some charities have a policy that they will not spend 
more than 1% of the donation to honor the donor.272 Also, the charity 
is promising to forego its right to sell the naming honor to a different 
donor. For example, if the “ask amount” for a particular naming right 
is $250,000, and the first donor pledges $250,000 and claims the 
naming right, the charity has lost its right to sell that naming right to 
anyone else. In contrast, if the first donor pledges $250,000 and 
requests anonymity, the charity still can offer the naming opportunity 
for $250,000. 
Second, in regards to the charity’s promise to use the 
contribution for a particular purpose, as discussed in greater detail 
below,273 not every legal detriment will be sufficient to satisfy the 
consideration requirement because of the party’s intentions or other 
factors.274 In regards to the charity’s promise to use the donated funds 
for a particular purpose, some courts indicate this can be 
consideration,275 but other courts, for sound reasons, have rejected 
this argument. The argument is particularly weak when a charity 
merely agrees to use the donated funds consistent with its charitable 
purposes276 or when the donor’s intent is to make a conditional gift.277
In regard to whether the detriment to the charity induces the 
donor’s promise, this test asks whether the donor promised to 
contribute because the charity promised naming rights or agreed to 
another legal detriment. Intuitively, it might seem that this 
requirement would prevent some charitable naming rights 
 271. See Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 867 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that a substantial donor was not entitled to any 
recognition).
 272. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 19, at 151-52. 
 273. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text (discussing the 
benevolent man hypothetical). 
 274. For example, the donor may be indifferent about the name and may not 
have bargained for the naming right. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 16 (reporting 
that when Steven A. Schwarzman gave $100 million for the renovation of the New 
York Public Library System it “was not his idea” to have the library named after 
him).
 275. See infra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 276. See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
 277. See infra notes 308-21 and accompanying text. 
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transactions from being contracts because the donor might have 
given even without the naming. For example, Stephen Schwarzman 
maintains that when he donated $100 million to the New York Public 
Library, he did not intend to acquire the naming rights.278
In applying this test,279 there are two important, non-intuitive, 
established doctrines that can be difficult to apply in charitable 
naming rights deals. First, it is well settled that the charity’s 
detriment need not be the only thing that induces the promise, and 
courts and commentators observe that a part-gift/part-sale transaction 
is a contract supported by consideration.280 Second, if the donor is 
making a gift and merely imposes a condition that is necessary for 
the charity to receive the gift, the charity’s agreement to perform the 
condition is not consideration to support a contract.281 These 
doctrines are discussed in more detail below.282
In regard to whether the donor’s promise induced the charity’s 
detriment, often it is clear that the charity is granting the naming 
rights in return for a particular pledge, especially in the context of a 
fundraising drive.283 Nevertheless, there may be situations in which 
the donor has a strong connection to the charity, and it might be 
possible that the charity would have named the item regardless of a 
promised donation. For example, a school may be building a new 
athletic facility, a former coach at the school might promise to make 
a significant donation to help defray the cost, and the school might 
decide to name the new facility after the coach. There could be a 
bona fide issue of whether the coach’s donation induced the school 
to name the facility after the coach. Perhaps the school would have 
named the athletic facility after the former coach even if the coach 
had contributed nothing.284    
In regard to the adequacy of consideration, the case of a 
charitable naming transaction involving substantial sums, the amount 
of the contribution likely will significantly exceed the economic 
 278. The library system added Schwarzman’s name to the façade in front of 
its flagship building on Fifth Avenue in New York City. See supra note 274 and 
accompanying text.  
 279. See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text. 
 280. See infra notes 285-99 and accompanying text. 
 281. See infra notes 308-21 and accompanying text. 
 282. See infra notes 285-321 and accompanying text.  
 283. BURTON, supra note 19, at 134 (discussing the practice of offering 
naming opportunities to donors as part of a successful capital campaign). 
 284. See, e.g., In re Carson’s Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 489-90 (Pa. 1944) 
(educational and religious organization planned to name a new building after Dr. 
John F. Carson even before his sister-in-law made a pledge). 
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value of the naming rights. A researcher has concluded that as a rule 
of thumb, charities tend to ask a naming donor to contribute 50% of 
the construction cost of the property to be named,285 although the 
percentage can be lower in the case of a mega-gift286 from a donor 
with “pharaonic wealth.”287 The analogy is not perfect, but 
commercial firms typically pay from 10% to 20% of the construction 
cost to name a new professional sports stadium or arena.288 Also, 
while cost may have little or no correlation to value in this area, it is 
worth noting that some charities have a policy of not spending more 
on publicity than 1% of the donor’s gift.289 Although this analysis is 
far from precise, it seems likely that a donor’s contribution typically 
will exceed the monetary value of the naming rights.290
It is a fundamental maxim of contract law that courts will not 
inquire into the adequacy of consideration,291 even when the 
economic value given in exchange is much less.292 The policy is that 
“it would be an unwarranted interference with freedom of contract if 
[the courts] were to relieve an adult party from a bad exchange.”293
Related to this concept, if the promisor makes a part gift/part 
sale, there will not be a failure of consideration because the 
consideration “need not be the sole or even the predominant 
inducement, but it must be enough of an inducement so that it is in 
fact bargained for.”294 A leading commentator provides the following 
example: If you sell your friend a used car worth $5,000 for $1,000, 
the promise to pay $1,000 can be regarded as an inducement for your 
 285. BURTON, supra note 19, at 142 (“The general rule of thumb for naming 
a newly constructed building or outdoor space is a donation equivalent to 50% of the 
project cost.”). 
 286. See, e.g., Pogrebin, supra note 13 (stating that entertainment mogul 
David Geffen pledged $100 million and that the renovation is expected to cost more 
than $500 million); Eisenberg, supra note 16 (reporting that Stephen Schwarzman 
donated 10% of the cost to renovate the New York City library system).  
 287. Pomorski, supra note 26 (discussing donors with “pharaonic wealth”). 
 288. See Drennan, supra note 21, at 94-96.  
 289. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 151. 
 290. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 n.2 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 291. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981); see also PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 154.  
 292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. a. 
 293. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 154. 
 294. Id. (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (“Ordinarily . . . courts do not inquire into the adequacy of 
consideration . . . even when it is clear that the transaction is a mixture of bargain 
and gift.”). 
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promise to transfer the car, and therefore adequate consideration, 
even though the most important factor inducing your promise was 
friendship.295 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes employed a “famous 
hypothetical that if a painter agrees to paint a portrait for [only] 
$500, the transaction will be treated as a bargain even if the painter is 
chiefly motivated by a desire for fame.”296 This latter example may 
be a transaction in a glory or honor market.297 In the case of a 
charitable naming transaction, the facts may be crucial in deciding 
whether the naming was enough of an inducement so that it is in fact 
bargained for. For example, it seems unlikely and unreasonable to 
believe that Betty Ford bargained for a charity to name an alcoholism 
center after her,298 or that Arnold Palmer bargained to have his name 
emblazoned on a prostate cancer center.299
Although it seems unlikely to arise in a naming transaction, 
disparity in value may indicate that the purported consideration was 
merely a pretense designed to make the promise of a future gift 
legally enforceable. In these situations, the amount or value 
exchanged has been described as “nominal.”300 The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts provides this example: “[I]n consideration of 
one cent received, A promises to pay $600 in three yearly 
installments of $200 each. The one cent is merely nominal and is not 
consideration for A’s promise.”301 Similarly, a leading commentator 
provides an example in which a daughter promises her father $10 in 
exchange for the father’s promise to transfer property worth 
$100,000 to the daughter in the future.302 In these situations, the 
nominal amount did not induce the other party’s promise, so there 
was no genuine bargain.303 Whether the stated consideration is a mere 
pretense is a question of fact for the jury.304 In addition, gross 
 295. See PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 159. 
 296. See Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 823-24 n.14 (citing OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 320 (1881)). 
 297. See infra notes 390-433 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Betty Ford Center Rancho Mirage, HAZELDEN BETTY FORD 
FOUND., http://www.bettyfordcenter.org [https://perma.cc/YB74-7W8Q] (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2017). 
 299. See Arnold Palmer Prostate Center, EISENHOWER MED. CTR., http:// 
www.emc.org/health-services/eisenhower-lucy-curci-cancer-center-of-excellence/arnold-
palmer-prostate-center/ [https://perma.cc/5SKQ-V86R] (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
 300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. d. 
 301. Id. illus. 5. 
 302. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 159. 
 303. See id.
 304. See id.
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inequality in the exchange may be relevant in proving that the 
arrangement is unenforceable because of lack of capacity, 
misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, duress, or undue influence.305
Likewise, although it is unlikely to be an issue in a substantial 
charitable naming transaction, the mere diminutiveness of a 
detriment or benefit may trigger other doctrines that will make the 
contract unenforceable. For example, the consideration may be so 
small that it may contribute to a court concluding that the parties 
really did not intend for the transaction to be legally enforceable.306
Thus, if a donor contributes millions and the charity includes the 
donor’s name on a plaque along with hundreds of other donors who 
each gave at least $10,000, a court may conclude that the publicity 
will not change the transaction from a gift to an enforceable bargain. 
Also, a court can declare a bargain unenforceable because “the law 
disregards trifles” if the naming right is de minimis.307
b. Distinguishing Contracts from Conditional Gifts 
A part-gift/part-sale transaction is an enforceable contract 
supported by consideration,308 but a conditional gift transaction is 
not. Thus, it’s necessary to draw a line distinguishing these 
transactions. Courts demonstrate a conditional gift with the story of 
the benevolent man and the homeless man. In the story, the 
benevolent man promises the homeless man that the homeless man 
can receive an overcoat and charge it on the benevolent man’s 
account if the homeless man will go to the department store around 
the corner and pick out an overcoat.309 The homeless man promises to 
make the trip and acquire an overcoat. Although the homeless man, 
in the absence of this transaction, would not be legally required to 
walk around the corner and pick out an overcoat, and thus he appears 
 305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. e; see also
Dohrmann v. Swaney, 14 N.E.3d 605, 612-14 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014). 
 306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (providing that “a 
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent 
the formation of a contract”). 
 307. See generally Jeff Nemerofsky, What Is a “Trifle” Anyway?, 37 GONZ.
L. REV. 315, 316, 323-24, 333 (2002). See also Harris v. Time, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 
3d 449, 452, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 308. See supra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.  
 309. See Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595, 
600-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). See generally 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 112, at 231-32 (1920). 
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to perform an act constituting a legal detriment, this transaction is 
classified as an unenforceable promise to make a future gift.310
In addition to agreeing on the benevolent man example, courts 
and commentators also agree that it can be difficult to draw the line 
between (i) a detriment that is bargained for and (ii) a detriment that 
is merely a condition of a gift.311 Actual determinations may be 
controversial.312 For example, in the hoary, often-studied case of 
Kirksey v. Kirksey,313 a landowner wrote to his widowed sister-in-law 
stating he had “more open land than [he] can tend,” and he would 
furnish her with a house and land to cultivate until she had raised her 
children if she would “come down and see [him].”314 The widow was 
renting at the time, “was comfortably settled,” and “would have 
attempted to secure the land she lived on.”315 Nevertheless, within a 
month or two of receiving the brother-in-law’s letter, she and her 
children moved approximately sixty miles to live in a house and 
cultivate a parcel on her brother-in-law’s land.316 After two years he 
evicted his sister-in-law. The sister-in-law sued, but the court 
concluded that the brother-in-law made a promise of a “mere 
gratuity” and that the actions taken by the sister-in-law were merely 
necessary conditions to accepting the gift.317 As a result, the 
landowner did not breach a contract; he merely cancelled his promise 
to make a future gift, so his sister-in-law was entitled to no damages.  
Leading commentators suggest two factors to draw the line 
between a legal detriment that qualifies as consideration and an 
action or promise that is merely a condition to receive a gift. First, 
“[t]he smallness of the detriment is one of the factors . . . in 
determining whether the promisor has bargained for the named 
 310. See Pennsy, 895 A.2d at 600-01.  
 311. See PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 156; see also 3 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 7:18, at 415-16 (4th ed. 2008) (citing six cases).  
 312. See, e.g., William R. Casto & Val D. Ricks, “Dear Sister Antillico . . .”: 
The Story of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 94 GEO. L.J. 321, 323-24 (2006) (questioning the 
Kirksey case); see also, e.g., Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the 
Performance of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract 
Cases, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 1, 40-44 (2009) (indicating that the record in the 
Kirksey case did not accurately reflect the transactions, making it difficult to 
determine if the court ruled wisely).  
 313. 8 Ala. 131 (1845). 
 314. Id. at 132. 
 315. Id.
 316. See id.
 317. See id. at 131-32. 
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detriment.”318 This helps determine “whether the promisor manifests 
a gift-making state of mind or a contract-making state of mind.”319
Second, if the “happening of the contingency would be a benefit to 
the promisor,” there is likely consideration to support a contract.320
Focusing on whether the promisor received a benefit, some courts 
endorse a reasonableness test. 
As to the distinction between consideration and a condition, it is often 
difficult to determine whether words of condition in a promise indicate a 
request for consideration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous promise. 
An aid, though not a conclusive test, in determining which construction of 
the promise is more reasonable is an inquiry into whether the occurrence 
of the condition would benefit the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that 
the occurrence was requested as consideration. On the other hand, if the 
occurrence of the condition is no benefit to the promisor but is merely to 
enable the promisee to receive a gift, the occurrence of the event . . . is not 
properly construed as consideration.321
c.  Consideration in Charitable Naming Rights Cases 
Often the enforceability of the charitable naming right is 
intertwined with the enforceability of the donor’s pledge. For 
example, in the landmark Allegheny College322 case, the donor, Mary 
Yates Johnston, pledged $5,000 and directed that the College hold 
the money in a fund for scholarships to be known as the Mary Yates 
Johnston Memorial Fund.323 Later, Johnston contributed $1,000 
toward the pledge, and the College set the $1,000 aside as a 
scholarship fund. When Johnston died, the College sued to enforce 
the remaining $4,000 pledge.324 Justice Cardozo, writing for the 
majority, had a few choices when deciding whether Johnston’s 
promise to donate was supported by consideration. First, the pledge 
 318. PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 156. 
 319. Id.
 320. Id. at 157. 
 321. See, e.g., Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 
595, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. 
Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927); see also, e.g., Fritz v. 
Fritz, 767 N.W.2d 420, 2009 WL 779544, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2009) 
(citing 3 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 311, § 7:18, at 412-18).
 322. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).  
 323. See id. at 174. The pledge document included language that also could 
be read to allow the College to place the money in an endowment. See id. (“The 
proceeds of this obligation shall be added to the Endowment of [the College], or 
expended [as a scholarship].”). 
 324. See id.
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document itself recited, “in consideration of others subscribing, I 
hereby subscribe and will pay [$5,000].”325 Some courts have 
concluded that other donors’ pledges toward the same project can 
constitute consideration to support a contract,326 but other courts and 
some leading commentators have severely criticized that approach as 
a legal fiction.327 Second, the pledge document restricted the 
College’s use of the $5,000; according to the court, the College had 
to use the money as a scholarship fund for ministry students.328 This 
restriction on the College’s use of the money technically could have 
qualified as a legal detriment, and therefore consideration, because 
the College agreed to do something it was not legally obligated to 
do.329 Arguably this seems like a variation of the story of the 
benevolent man and the homeless man; if the homeless man asks for 
the money to buy a coat, and the benevolent man says, “I promise to 
give you $150 tomorrow that you must use to buy a coat,” it appears 
this is simply an unenforceable promise to make a gift in the future. 
In also questioning whether the charity provides consideration to 
support a donor’s promise to contribute in the future by using the 
 325. Id.
 326. See 13 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 136, § 37:40, at 281-82 n.1 
(listing nine cases regarding this approach).  
 327. See, e.g., Md. Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n, 407 A.2d 
1130, 1138 (Md. 1979) (“[The donor’s pledge] was utilized . . . to obtain substantial 
pledges from others. But this was a technique employed to raise money. It did not 
supply a legal consideration . . . .”); see also, e.g., Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 
290 So. 2d 484, 485-87 (Fla. 1974) (holding a pledge unenforceable even though the 
pledge document recited that the pledge was in consideration of the subscription of 
others); PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 226 (stating that a donation “may 
be motivated by [other gifts] . . . but there is ordinarily no element of exchange 
between the various promisors”); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS 272 (5th ed. 2011) (“The typical subscriber is not bargaining for the 
promises of others.”); Budig et al., supra note 91, at 52; see also I. & I. Holding 
Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 1938) (“It is unquestioned that the 
request that other subscribers make contributions, . . . stated as a consideration in the 
subscription agreement, is not consideration . . . .”).  
 328. See Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 174. 
 329. See, e.g., Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 442 P.2d 93, 94, 96 
(Ariz. 1968) (demonstrating that a court can order a charity to return a contribution 
if the charity fails to use the amount within a reasonable time for the designated 
project); see also, e.g., Neb. Wesleyan Univ. v. Estate of Couch (In re Estate of 
Couch), 103 N.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Neb. 1960) (the school’s agreement to use a 
$5,000 donation for scholarships to “worthy girls” was consideration); Cent. Me. 
Gen. Hosp. v. Carter, 132 A. 417, 420 (Me. 1926) (an agreement to use the funds 
received for a special purpose was “a sufficient consideration to support the promise 
to give”).  
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money for a specific charitable purpose, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has stated, “the promise implied in the acceptance involves no 
act advantageous to the [donor] or detrimental to the [charity], and 
hence does not involve a case of mutual promises and . . . the duty of 
the [charity] arise[s] from trusteeship rather than a contractual 
promise . . . .”330
Justice Cardozo rejected these two options and chose to employ 
a third approach. He directly addressed the issue whether the naming 
right over the scholarship fund was adequate consideration.331 Justice 
Cardozo employed the basic three-part objective bargain test for 
consideration discussed earlier332 along with the principle that a part 
gift/part sale can be a contract supported by adequate consideration. 
Justice Cardozo wrote, “The promise and the consideration must 
purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in 
part.”333 Clearly, the consideration supplied by the donor was the 
promise to contribute $5,000. On the other side of the transaction, 
Justice Cardozo concluded that the College provided adequate 
consideration to Johnston for two reasons: (i) the College incurred a 
legal detriment and (ii) the donor enjoyed a benefit.334 First, the 
College incurred a legal detriment because it promised “to do 
whatever acts were customary or reasonably necessary to maintain 
the memorial fairly and justly in the spirit of its creation,”335
including “the duty . . . to perpetuate the name.”336 Justice Cardozo 
stated that this obligation was “sufficient in itself to give validity to 
the subscription.”337 This conclusion is particularly significant in the 
naming rights market because the College likely had minimal duties 
in connection with this named scholarship fund. In contrast to other 
naming situations, the donor’s name did not need to be inscribed in 
 330. See, e.g., Dalhousie Coll. at Halifax v. Boutilier Estate, [1934] S.C.R. 
642, 649 (Can.). 
 331. See Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 175.  
 332. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text; see also Cozzillio, 
supra note 23, at 1336 (attributing the three-part test to Justice Cardozo’s analysis in 
Allegheny College). Justice Cardozo also indicated that he could have resolved this 
dispute by reference to promissory estoppel concepts. See Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. 
at 175; see also Bridgeman, supra note 229, at 150 (pointing out that most contracts 
casebooks deal with Allegheny College in the promissory estoppel section).  
 333. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 174 (quoting Wis. & Mich. Ry. Co. v. 
Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903)). 
 334. Id. at 175-76.  
 335. Id. at 175. 
 336. Id. at 176. 
 337. Id.
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stone, letterhead and business cards did not need to be changed, and 
no one had to answer the phone differently.  
Second, Justice Cardozo found that the charitable naming 
rights provided a benefit to the donor. He stated, “The longing for 
posthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us 
in saying that its gratification is a negligible good.”338 Justice 
Cardozo stated that if the promisor enjoys a benefit, “it is a fair 
inference that the happening was requested as a consideration.”339
Justice Cardozo concluded that the gratification of an emotion can be 
a benefit qualifying as consideration, even though he makes no 
attempt to place a dollar value on that emotion. There are other 
situations in which courts have concluded that a benefit with only 
speculative economic value will constitute consideration.340
Also, in Stock v. Augsburg College, the court indicated that a 
charity’s agreement to name is sufficient consideration to allow a 
charitable pledge to be a contract.341 Elroy Stock pledged and paid 
$500,000 in connection with Augsburg College’s promise that a new 
building would have an “Elroy Stock Communications Wing.”342 The 
College accepted and retained Stock’s money, but the College later 
refused to name the wing after Stock.
The court considered whether Stock could have recovered his 
$500,000 transfer to the College if he had sued within the six-year 
statute of limitations for contract actions.343 In deciding that the 
transaction was a contract rather than a conditional gift, an important 
factor was the donor’s intent.344 The court found that the following 
facts supported the donor’s argument that he intended a contractual 
bargain rather than a gift: (i) the College’s literature for the fund 
drive stated, “[N]amed gift opportunities are numerous;” (ii) a 
College representative suggested that the wing could be named after 
Stock and later sent a letter that “recognized [Stock’s] . . . right to . . . 
name the wing;” (iii) the College’s Board of Regents voted to name 
the wing after Stock; and (iv) Stock increased the amount of his 
 338. Id. (emphasis added). 
 339. Id. (quoting 1 WILLISTON, supra note 309, § 112, at 232-33). 
 340. See infra notes 390-417 (baby-name cases). 
 341. See Stock v. Augsburg Coll., No. C1-01-1673, 2002 WL 555944, at *7 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002) (concluding that the arrangement was an enforceable 
contract, but the donor failed to sue within the applicable statute of limitations 
period).
 342. Id. at *1.  
 343. See id. at *6-7. 
 344. See id. at *6. 
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donation to $500,000 because he thought it would be inappropriate to 
have the naming rights if he merely contributed the original amount 
($100,000) suggested by the College’s representative.345 Based on 
these facts, the court concluded that the College “[solicited money] 
in exchange for the promise to name,”346 and Stock’s intent was “not 
[to make] a donation to the [College’s] general building fund.”347 In 
support of this conclusion, the court listed the following policy 
reasons: (i) Colleges, like individuals and other entities, should honor 
their commitments; (ii) courts of law and equity should enforce legal 
contracts; and (iii) just debts should be paid.348
Consistent with the approach in Augsburg College, in the case 
of In re Bashas’ Inc., when considering whether to enforce a ten-year 
pledge after the donor reneged in year two, the court, in dicta, said, 
“Perhaps if [the charity] demonstrated that they promised to 
acknowledge debtors in exchange for [the debtor’s] promise to 
donate money, there might have been consideration.”349
Two cases indicate that even if the naming arrangement will 
honor a third party rather than the donor, the charitable arrangement 
may be a contract. In Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church of 
Wickenburg,350 the donor pledged $10,000 toward construction of an 
annex to the Church’s Sunday school building and stipulated “that 
there be a plaque ‘honoring Reverend and Mrs. Poling.’”351 There is 
no indication that the donor was in any way related to the Reverend 
Poling or Mrs. Poling other than the donor attended services at the 
Church, and the Reverend Poling was the pastor. When Church 
officials asked the donor if they could use the money for a different 
purpose, the donor requested the return of his contribution. The court 
stated that the Church’s acceptance of the stock was “an implied 
promise agreeing to the purposes for which it [was] offered,”352 then 
it concluded that from this promise “arises a bilateral contract 
supported by a valuable consideration.”353 The court cited nine cases 
for this proposition354 but provided no substantive analysis of the 
 345. Id. at *1.  
 346. Id. at *7. 
 347. Id.
 348. See id. at *6. 
 349. In re Bashas’ Inc., 468 B.R. 381, 383 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
 350. 442 P.2d 93, 93 (Ariz. 1968) (concluding that the charitable 
arrangement was a bilateral contract). 
 351. Id. at 94. 
 352. Id. at 95. 
 353. Id.
 354. See id. (including Allegheny College).
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consideration issue. Thus, it may be that the court found 
consideration because the Church agreed to use the money for a 
specific purpose (building the annex), although courts and 
commentators analyzing charitable pledges often reject that view.355
Alternatively, perhaps the court found consideration because the 
Church agreed to include the plaque honoring the Reverend and Mrs. 
Poling. The latter is a possibility because a promise that does not 
benefit the promisor may still be consideration if the benefit flows to 
a designated third party.356
Also, in Carson’s Estate, the donor made a pledge to help 
finance a new building to be named after her brother-in-law at Stony 
Brook School.357 When the school failed to build the building, the 
court concluded that the charity had breached a contract,358 and the 
charity could not collect on the pledge. The court’s analysis of the 
consideration issue was conclusory.359
In other cases involving prominent charitable naming rights, 
the courts concluded that the donor’s promise to contribute was 
supported by consideration, but the courts failed to indicate whether 
it was the promise to grant naming rights, or some other promise or 
action by the charity, that was the consideration. For example, in 
Paul & Irene Bogoni Foundation v. St. Bonaventure University, the 
donors pledged $2 million to the University toward the construction 
of an addition to St. Bonaventure’s library to house its rare books 
collection.360 The University constructed the addition and agreed to 
name it after the donors.361 The donors failed to pay $900,000 of the 
pledge. In the ensuing litigation, the court concluded that the 
arrangement was a contract, and the University accepted the donors’ 
offer “by incurring liability in reliance thereon.”362 Unfortunately, 
there was no discussion of whether the consideration was the 
 355. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
 356. See PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 130, at 152. 
 357. See In re Carson’s Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 489 (Pa. 1944). 
 358. See id. at 489. 
 359. See id. at 491 (“There is no question at this time that it was a valid 
contract, and that it was supported by consideration sufficient to contracts of this 
sort.”).
 360. See Paul & Irene Bogoni Found. v. St. Bonaventure Univ., No. 
102095/08, 2009 WL 6318140, at 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2009). 
 361. See id. at 15 n.2 (“The July 2007 correspondence . . . indicates that they 
agreed [on the name] . . . [h]owever, . . . the record does not indicate whether the 
University withheld [the naming] honor in view of the [donors’] refusal to fulfill 
their pledge obligation.”). 
 362. Id. at 12. 
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University’s agreement to use the funds for the donors’ specified 
purpose363 or the University’s promise to name.  
Similarly, in Woodmere Academy,364 the donor failed to pay the 
full amount of his pledge even though the Academy named its library 
after his wife.365 The court found that the arrangement was a 
contract366 but failed to specify the legal detriment to the charity, or 
the benefit to the donor, that constituted the consideration. The court 
merely said that the Academy had accepted the pledge “by incurring 
liability in reliance thereon.”367
d. Reflections on Bargaining and Charitable Naming Rights 
It is difficult to categorically conclude that all charitable 
naming rights transactions are gifts or that they are all contracts, in 
part because of the wide variation in the facts concerning bargaining 
between the charity and the donor. At one end of the spectrum are 
situations when it would probably be in the donor’s best economic 
interest if the charity would not use the donor’s name. Examples 
might include the Betty Ford Alcoholism Rehabilitation Treatment 
Facility, the Arnold Palmer Prostate Center, and the Kirk Douglas 
Alzheimer’s Care Pavilion.368
Another example on that half of the spectrum might be the 
addition of Stephen Schwarzman’s name to the façade of the New 
York City Public Library’s flagship building on Fifth Avenue at 
42nd Street in connection with his $100 million contribution.369
 363. See id. at 4 (the specified purpose was to build the rare books addition 
to the library).  
 364. Woodmere Acad. v. Steinberg, 363 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1977), aff’g 53 
A.D.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (concluding that the charitable arrangement was 
a unilateral contract). 
 365. Woodmere Acad., 53 A.D.2d at 158-59 (summarizing correspondence in 
which the Academy states, “[O]ur library, as you know, has been named ‘The 
Barbara Steinberg Learning Center,’” and that the “building will continue to be so 
designated as long as it is a part of the school”).  
 366. See id. at 160. 
 367. Id.
 368. See supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text (regarding Betty Ford 
and Arnold Palmer); see also Ben Gose, Bill Cosby, Donald Sterling and Charities’ 
“Nightmare” Naming-Rights Problem, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 20, 2015, 9:00 
AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/bill-cosby-donald-sterling-charities-
815959 [https://perma.cc/LVM2-9HY4] (discussing the Kirk Douglas Alzheimer’s 
Center).  
 369. See Pogrebin, supra note 13.  
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Schwarzman says the naming was at the charity’s insistence,370 and 
Schwarzman’s name is carved in smaller letters at the library 
entrance than the library’s earlier benefactors, namely Astor, Tilden, 
and Lenox.371 Arguably, under these facts, the library’s agreement to 
add Schwarzman’s name did not induce Schwarzman to contribute.  
At the other end of the spectrum might be the failed 
negotiations between Paul Smith’s College in upstate New York and 
Sanford and Joan Weill. Sanford Weill is the former CEO of 
Citigroup, and the Weills are extremely generous. One article states 
the Weills have contributed “so many hundreds of millions to so 
many causes, especially in New York City, that the Weill name has 
become virtually ineluctable.”372 In 2015, the Weills pledged $20 
million to Paul Smith’s College on the condition that the school 
change its name to Joan Weill-Paul Smith’s College. When a judge 
ultimately ruled that a stipulation in Paul Smith’s will that the school 
be “forever known” as Paul Smith’s College of Arts and Sciences 
prevented the proposed name change, the Weills “rescinded their 
gift.”373 These facts indicate the Weills bargained for the naming 
rights because they refused to make the donation without the naming 
rights. 
Heavy-handed terms in favor of a naming donor may indicate 
that the donor bargained for the naming rights. In the Lincoln 
Center-Fisher family situation, Lincoln Center granted Avery Fisher 
perpetual naming rights over the philharmonic hall in 1973 in 
connection with his $10.5 million donation.374 This proved very 
costly for Lincoln Center because the Fisher family blocked the 
charity’s attempt to renovate the building in 2002 and only relented 
in 2014 when Lincoln Center paid the Fisher family $15 million plus 
various perks.375 After paying off the Fisher family, Lincoln Center 
began its fund raising drive to renovate the philharmonic hall. 
Eventually Lincoln Center accepted a $100 million pledge from 
generous entertainment mogul David Geffen, but it agreed to grant 
perpetual naming rights to Geffen. Under the circumstances, it seems 
unlikely that Lincoln Center suggested that Geffen take perpetual 
naming rights. Some have called Lincoln Center’s decision 
 370. See Eisenberg, supra note 16. 
 371. See Konigsberg & Howe, supra note 37. 
 372. Id.
 373. Id. Technically it would be more accurate to say the Weills were 
relieved of their pledge obligation because the College failed to meet a condition. Id. 
 374. See supra notes 10 & 13 and accompanying text. 
 375. See Pogrebin, supra note 13.  
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“shortsighted.”376 It seems much more reasonable that Lincoln Center 
would have offered Geffen twenty or thirty year naming rights. One 
charitable expert stated, “Perpetuity is a very long time. . . . This will 
not be the last renovation of Avery Fisher Hall, and when you give 
rights in perpetuity you make it very challenging to find the money 
that will be needed 20, 30, 40, 50 years from now.”377 When asked 
about the perpetual feature, Geffen reportedly said, “I think it’s 
appropriate. . . . How often can you change the name of this hall?”378
Geffen likely bargained strenuously for the perpetual naming rights. 
e. Transactions Involving Emotional Benefits, Including 
Baby Names and Hush Money Deals 
It may seem challenging to find that a charity’s promise to 
grant naming rights is consideration for a donor’s pledge because 
naming rights are difficult to value. With naming rights, the benefits 
may be emotional as well as economic. An individual donor 
acquiring significant charitable naming rights likely is enjoying both 
(i) emotional benefits such as improved self-esteem and a “warm 
glow”379 that are present in a typical, unenforceable gift situation380
and (ii) potential economic benefits such as an improved reputation 
for power, wealth, and generosity among referral sources and other 
business associates.381 As an indication that a naming contribution 
likely involves some altruistic generosity,382 as a rule-of-thumb, 
 376. Robin Pogrebin, How David Geffen’s $100 Million Lincoln Center Gift 
Came Together, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/ 
arts/music/how-david-geffens-100-million-lincoln-center-gift-came-together.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/33J8-P9J2]. 
 377. Id. (quoting Michael M. Kaiser, Chairman of the DeVos Institute of 
Arts Management at the University of Maryland). 
 378. Pogrebin, supra note 13.  
 379. Colombo, supra note 21, at 663, 669-79 (discussing research in the 
fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, and social psychology). 
 380. In the hypothetical of the benevolent man and the homeless man, see
supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text. The benevolent man may experience 
improved self-esteem and the warm glow commonly associated with charitable 
giving. See Colombo, supra note 21, at 663, 669-79 (discussing benefits from 
charitable giving).  
 381. See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and 
Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 575-76 (1997) (stating that charitable 
giving signals wealth and generosity); see also OSTROWER, supra note 44 
(discussing the potential business benefits of charitable giving). 
 382. But see Colombo, supra note 21, at 669-79 (discussing social science 
research indicating that altruism may not be involved in charitable giving for many).  
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charities typically set the ask amount for a naming opportunity at 
50% of the construction cost of the named item.383 In contrast, 
corporations purchasing naming rights to professional sports 
stadiums and arenas typically pay from 10% to 20% of the 
construction cost of the stadium or arena.384 Granted, the type of 
economic benefit differs, but the fact that donors pay more to 
charities suggests some altruism.385
Although the mixed benefits make it difficult to establish a 
monetary value for the charitable naming rights, contract law does 
not require precise valuations; it is not necessary that the value given 
by each party is equal to have a contract.386 Also, as discussed above, 
there is authority that consideration can be noneconomic. In 
Allegheny College, Justice Cardozo expressly states that the 
gratification of an emotion can be consideration.387 On the other 
hand, courts have concluded that love and affection are not 
consideration because they are not for sale,388 perhaps suggesting that 
the love of one person is not what induces the love of another 
person.389 So when there is an emotional benefit, how do the courts 
decide whether the transaction is a gift or a contract? These types of 
issues can arise in other markets, including the baby-name market 
and the embarrassing secrets market. 
 383. BURTON, supra note 19, at 142. But see Pogrebin, supra note 13; infra
note 384 and accompanying text. The percentage may be significantly less for mega-
gifts.
 384. See Drennan, supra note 21, at 94-96. 
 385. Commercial entities buying the naming rights for professional sports 
stadiums and arenas typically are purchasing brand recognition. See BURTON, supra
note 19, at 41-42. The economic benefit for the individual donor buying charitable 
naming rights is more likely a greater reputation for wealth, power, and generosity 
among potential referral sources and other constituencies. See Posner, supra note 
381, at 575-76. 
 386. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text. 
 387. See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 
(N.Y. 1927).  
 388. See, e.g., Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik, 403 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980) (concluding that “love and affection are not subject to sale, [therefore] a 
promise founded upon these considerations is not enforceable and cannot be the 
foundation for a legal action”). 
 389. See supra notes 264-68 (discussing the three-part test for consideration, 
which includes that the promise or action of one party must induce the promise or 
action of the other party). 
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The leading baby-name case is Schumm v. Berg390 involving an 
illegitimate child of the famous actor Wallace Beery.391 Gloria 
Schumm and Wallace Beery conceived a child in May 1947 when 
Wallace Beery was sixty-three years old. Beery declined to marry 
and refused to acknowledge paternity, but the court found that he 
agreed to a detailed and lengthy oral contract.392 Under the contract, 
Gloria Schumm agreed to (i) include the name “Wallace” in the 
child’s name if the child was a boy or “Wally” if the child was a girl 
and (ii) refrain from instituting a paternity suit which the parties 
agreed would damage Wallace Beery’s “social and professional 
standing as a prominent motion picture star.”393 Generally, under 
state law, a father who neither marries the mother nor acknowledges 
paternity does not have a right to name the child; instead, that right 
belongs to the mother.394 In exchange for Gloria’s promise to name, 
Wallace Beery agreed to arrange for the payment of $100 per week 
to the child (as a third party beneficiary under the contract), plus a 
lump sum of $25,000 to the child when the child attained age twenty-
one,395 in addition to the customary obligation to pay for the 
“maintenance, support and education according to the station in life 
and standard of living of Wallace Beery.”396 The child was a boy, and 
Gloria Schumm named him Johan Richard Wallace Schumm.  
Wallace Beery died approximately fourteen months after the 
child was born. When his estate refused to make payments, the 
child’s guardian sued for damages of $104,135.397 The estate argued 
that the “right to name”398 did not constitute consideration to support 
 390. Schumm v. Berg, 231 P.2d 39 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (featured in Lewis 
C. Warden, Validity and Enforceability of Contract in Consideration of Naming 
Child, 21 A.L.R.2d 1061 (1952)). 
 391. Wallace Beery won an Academy Award for Best Actor, appeared in 
approximately 250 films, and at one time was regarding as one of Hollywood’s top 
ten movie stars. See Wallace Beery Biography, FANDANGO (last visited Jan. 2, 
2017), http://www.fandango.com/people/wallace-beery-47308/biography [https://perma. 
cc/3H9B-YN8G]; see also Wallace Beery, MOVIE DATABASE (last visited Jan. 2, 
2017), https://www.themoviedb.org/person/29260-Wallace-beery [https://perma.cc/ 
NVN6-AWFL].
 392. See Schumm, 231 P.2d at 41-43. 
 393. Id. at 41-42. 
 394. See Carton F.W. Larson, Naming Baby: The Constitutional Dimensions 
of Parental Naming Rights, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 164-66 (2011). 
 395. See Schumm, 231 P.2d at 42. Wallace Beery was to acquire two life 
insurance policies that would provide the funds to make the payments. Id.
 396. Id. at 42-43. 
 397. See id. at 43. 
 398. Id. at 44. 
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a contract. The California Supreme Court, en banc, stated that the 
mother’s promise to name the child with the given name Wallace 
was “adequate consideration [because] [i]t was a detriment to Gloria 
and a benefit to Beery.”399 In response to the estate’s argument that 
prior case law “did not give serious consideration to . . . the 
sufficiency of the ‘right to name’ as consideration,”400 the court 
stated,
Reason supports the rule, for having a child bear its father’s name is 
commonly considered a privilege and honor, and Beery assumed it was, 
for he obtained such a promise running to him. Merely because in the cited 
cases the promise was to use the putative father’s surname does not make 
them distinguishable. That is merely a matter of degree, and as seen, the 
validity of consideration does not depend on its value.401
An older baby-name case relies upon charitable naming rights 
authority in concluding that the promise to name a baby is sufficient 
consideration to support a contract. In Wolford v. Powers,402 an 
eighty-seven-year-old friend of the family, Charles Lehman, 
promised to pay $10,000 if Mr. & Mrs. Wolford would name their 
son Charles Lehman Wolford.403 The eighty-seven-year-old friend 
executed a promissory note memorializing his promise before his 
death, but his estate refused to pay the $10,000 arguing there was no 
consideration to support the promise. 
In response, the Indiana Supreme Court quoted a “philosophic 
treatise”404 by Thomas Hobbes stating, “The value of all things 
contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and 
therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give.”405
The Indiana court acknowledged that the analysis is more 
challenging when the court cannot easily reduce the exchanged 
detriment or benefit to a monetary value, but stated, “[w]here a party 
contracts for the performance of an act which will afford him 
pleasure, gratify his ambition, please his fancy, or express his 
 399. Id.
 400. Id.
 401. Id. at 45 (emphasis added). 
 402. See generally 85 Ind. 294 (1882). 
 403. See id. at 294-95. 
 404. Id. at 296; see also Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1381 n.2 (Del. Ch. 
1992) (identifying the treatise as THE LEVIATHAN).
 405. Wolford, 85 Ind. at 296 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT: BEING A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE 
VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND 189 (3d ed. 1881)); see
also Lewis C. Warden, Validity and Enforceability of Contract in Consideration of 
Naming Child, 21 A.L.R.2d 1061, 1063 (1952) (referring to Hobbes). 
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appreciation of a service another has done him, his estimate of value 
should be left undisturbed, unless, indeed, there is evidence of 
fraud.”406 After reviewing several English and U.S. cases on the 
enforceability of contracts and the sufficiency of consideration, the 
court concluded that baby naming should qualify as consideration 
because charitable naming rights historically have been 
consideration.
We find scattered through the books cases where devises of property are 
made upon conditions having no pecuniary value at all, and yet they are 
always enforced; and so we find men in life making subscriptions to 
colleges on condition that they shall bear their names, or endowing 
professorships upon condition that they shall be given their names, and, so 
far as our observation has extended, the validity of such conditions has 
never been challenged. It is evident that the naming of a college 
professorship or the like has always been considered as a matter of 
importance and value, for to declare otherwise would be to affirm that 
courts and law-writers have for ages been solemn respecters of worthless 
trifles. It will not do to say that the bestowal of a name is a valueless act, 
and if once it be granted to be of some value, then, in the absence of fraud 
and oppression, it must be held to possess the value placed upon it by the 
contracting parties.407
In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that a promise to pay $10,000 at death in exchange for naming a 
child Edward Gerrish Gardner was supported by consideration 
because the child “loses the opportunity of receiving a more 
advantageous name, and is compelled to bear whatever detriment 
may flow from the name imposed upon him.”408 This court’s 
discussion in 1914 about the advantages of some names and the 
detriment of others, found support in social science research relied 
upon by a legal scholar considering baby names recently:  
One study concluded that individuals with unusual first names show 
“more severe personality disturbance than those with common names.” 
Another found that there was a “significant tendency for boys with 
peculiar first names to be more severely emotionally disturbed than boys 
with non-peculiar first names.” A more recent study determined that 
“unpopular names are positively correlated with juvenile delinquency for 
both blacks and whites,” although the authors caution against inferring 
causation.409
 406. Wolford, 85 Ind. at 303 (emphasis added). 
 407. Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added). 
 408. Gardner v. Denison, 105 N.E. 359, 359-60 (Mass. 1914). 
 409. Larson, supra note 394, at 195 (quoting A. Arthur Hartman et al., 
Unique Personal Names as a Social Adjustment Factor, 75 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 
107 (1968); Albert Ellis & Robert M. Beechley, Emotional Disturbance in Children 
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Other baby-name cases support the view that naming is 
consideration even when the familial or friendship ties seem so 
strong that a transfer between the parties normally would be a gift. 
For example, in Daily v. Minnick, John Cochrane had taken James C. 
Daily into his home and raised him from the time he was a child until 
his marriage.410 The court stated that James C. Daily “was treated by 
Cochrane as a son,”411 although the court never referred to James C. 
Daily as Cochrane’s foster child. Shortly after the birth of James C. 
Daily’s son, Cochrane promised that if the child was named after 
Cochrane, he would acquire forty acres of land and leave it to the 
child upon Cochrane’s death. James C. Daily and his wife named the 
child after Cochrane. Cochrane acquired the land and held title to it, 
and he allowed James C. Daily to farm it and harvest the timber.412
After Cochrane died, James C. Daily sued to quiet title on behalf of 
his son. Although the close relationship of the parties might suggest 
the intent to give,413 the Iowa Supreme Court held that Cochrane 
“received the benefit of the name, and the parents parted with the 
right to give the child such name as they might choose. This, as has 
been seen, is a valuable consideration.”414
A baby-name case in which the court found a contract 
supported by consideration rather than a gift despite a direct family 
relationship was Babcock v. Chase.415 The parents named the child 
Catharine Babcock, and that was her name for four months. Initially, 
when her grandfather urged the parents to change the child’s first 
name to Harriett so that the name would “be kept in the family,” the 
parents refused.416 When grandfather promised to pay $500 to the 
child (upon the grandfather’s death), however, the parents agreed. 
After the grandfather’s death, the child sued the grandfather’s estate 
to collect the $500. Rather than concluding this was an 
unenforceable promise to make a gift from a grandparent to a 
with Peculiar Given Names, 85 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 337, 339 (1954); David E. 
Kalist & Daniel Y. Lee, First Names and Crime: Does Unpopularity Spell Trouble?,
90 SOC. SCI. Q. 39, 39 (2009)).  
 410. See 91 N.W. 913, 915 (Iowa 1902) (concluding that a baby-name 
transaction was a contract).  
 411. Id. at 914. 
 412. See id. Cochrane would not transfer title to the land to James C. Daily 
“for fear he would squander it.” Id.
 413. See supra notes 111-17 (discussing “intent to give” as an element for 
making a gift). 
 414. Daily, 91 N.W. at 915. 
 415. See 36 N.Y.S. 879, 881 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1895).  
 416. Id. at 879. 
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grandchild, the court relied on Wolford v. Powers and concluded that 
“we are of the opinion that a sufficient consideration is alleged for 
the promise . . . . There is no question here about the adequacy. That 
has been fixed by the parties.”417
Recently, a written agreement to pay money and property for a 
name change was declared unenforceable, in part, because the 
consideration to name the children was illusory.418 In Dohrmann v. 
Swaney, forty-year-old neurosurgeon George Dohrmann convinced 
his eighty-nine-year-old neighbor, Mrs. Rogers, to sign a document 
under which she agreed to pay Dohrmann $4 million from her estate 
plus her apartment on Lake Shore Drive in Chicago and all of its 
contents (an estimated total value of $5.5 million) in exchange for 
George Dohrmann’s agreement to incorporate the Rogers’ surname 
as a middle name “into his children’s name.”419 After George 
Dohrmann changed the name of his thirteen-year old son to George 
John Rogers Dohrmann and changed the name of his seven-year old 
son to Geoffrey Edward David Rogers Dohrmann and Rogers passed 
away, George Dohrmann sued to collect.420 The court declared the 
contract unenforceable, in part, because the promise to name was 
illusory, stating, 
[T]he contract is brief and makes no provision for when or even if the 
boys must actually use the name Rogers. It appears from the record before 
us that the boys have used the name only intermittently. Moreover, there is 
nothing in the contract to prevent the boys from legally removing Rogers 
as a middle name, particularly because they, as minors, were not parties to 
the contract. Where the consideration for a contract is illusory, the contract 
will be invalidated for gross inadequacy of consideration. Although the 
children allegedly took the Rogers name as their own in order to 
perpetuate the Rogers name after Mrs. Rogers’ death, enforcing that 
obligation is a legal impossibility. Accordingly, the consideration to this 
contract is illusory.421
The court in Schumm v. Berg stated that “privilege and honor” 
can be sufficient consideration to support a promise.422 The court did 
not explicitly state whether there was consideration because the 
mother incurred a detriment or because Wallace Beery enjoyed a 
benefit, but presumably the court was referring to the “privilege and 
 417. Id. at 881. 
 418. See Dohrmann v. Swaney, 14 N.E.3d 605, 614-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 419. Id. at 608-09, 613. 
 420. Id. at 608 n.1, 610.  
 421. Id. at 614-15. 
 422. 231 P.2d 39, 44-45 (Cal. 1951) (en banc). 
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honor” enjoyed by Wallace Beery. This is suggested by the language 
following the reference to “privilege and honor.”423
A famous contract law case arguably might involve pride, 
honor, or other good feelings even though the court never decides 
whether the promisor received a benefit at all. In Hamer v. Sidway,424
at a family party,425 an uncle promised his fifteen-year old426 nephew 
that if the nephew “would refrain from drinking liquor, using 
tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he 
should become [twenty-one] years of age,” he would pay him 
$5,000.427 After the nephew satisfied the requirements and the uncle 
died, the nephew’s assignee sued the uncle’s estate for the $5,000. 
The court concluded the nephew’s performance was consideration 
for the uncle’s promise. The court emphasized the detriment to the 
nephew and avoided affirmatively stating whether the uncle enjoyed 
a benefit.428 In regards to a benefit to the uncle, the court stated, 
[I]t is of no moment whether such performance actually provided a benefit 
to the [uncle], and the court will not inquire into it, but were it a proper 
subject of inquiry, we see nothing in this record that would permit a 
determination that the uncle was not benefited in a legal sense.429
Arguably an uncle might enjoy some feelings of pride and 
satisfaction in the commendable lifestyle of his nephew and might 
want to avoid feelings of regret and shame if the nephew became the 
town drunk, card shark, or pool hustler. Family members have 
expressed regret for the misdeeds of other family members on some 
occasions.430
 423. Id. at 45. Immediately after referring to “privilege and honor” the court 
discusses Wallace Beery, not the mother; the court says Beery “assumed it was [a 
privilege and honor] for he obtained such a promise running to him.” Id.
 424. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). Frequently, Hamer is included in law school 
casebooks. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, 
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 556 (1999) (referring to 
Hamer v. Sidway as a “war horse”).  
 425. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 256. Family and friends were celebrating the golden 
wedding anniversary of the uncle’s parents. Id.
 426. The uncle made the promise on March 20, 1869, and the nephew 
attained age twenty-one on January 31, 1875. Id.
 427. Id.
 428. See id. at 257. 
 429. Id.
 430. See, e.g., Cory Pippin, Father of Orlando Nightclub Shooter Condemns 
Son’s Actions, Calls It Act of ‘Terror’, KIMA TV (June 13, 2016), http://kimatv.com/ 
news/nation-world/father-of-orlando-nightclub-shooter-condemns-sons-actions-calls-it-
act-of-terror [https://perma.cc/HQK8-JVHV]; see also, e.g., Katrease Stafford, 
Kalamazoo Suspect’s Family Condemns His Actions, DET. FREE PRESS (Feb. 23, 
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The New York Court of Appeals in Hamer v. Sidway discussed 
other cases reaching similar results. In Shadwell v. Shadwell, an 
uncle promised his nephew “150 pounds yearly . . . until [his] annual 
income derived from [his] profession of a Chancery barrister shall 
amount to 600 guineas” if he would marry Ellen Nicholl.431 In Lakota 
v. Newton, the defendant promised the plaintiff $100 if he would 
“leave off drinking for a year.”432 In Talbott v. Stemmons, a step-
grandmother made an agreement with her grandson that she would 
pay him $500 at her death “if he will never take another chew of 
tobacco or smoke another cigar during [her life] . . . and if he breaks 
this pledge he is to refund double the amount to his mother.”433 In 
each case, the court enforced the promise. 
On the other hand, neither love nor affection are deemed 
consideration for contract law purposes. For example, in Lesnik v. 
Estate of Lesnik, the wife transferred the marital home into a land 
trust for the benefit of her children from a prior marriage, thereby 
preventing her second-husband from electing to take against her 
estate and claiming an interest in the home.434 Among other 
arguments, the husband asserted that the wife had promised to title 
the home as joint tenants with right of survivorship with him in 
exchange for “[his] promise . . . to be a kind, loving and affectionate 
husband.”435 The court stated that whether there was consideration 
was a question of law, and “because love and affection are not 
subject to sale, a promise founded upon these considerations is not 
enforceable.”436 Presumably, courts conclude that love is not subject 
to sale because love is not given in exchange for love; A may love B 
regardless of whether B loves A.437 Countless sad songs memorialize 
2016, 7:31 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/22/ 
kalamazoo-shooters-family-condemns-his-actions/80770444/ [https://perma.cc/EEB8-
FD8U]. 
 431. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (quoting Shadwell v. Shadwell [1860] 142 Eng. 
Rep. 62, 62). 
 432. Id. (referring to Lakota v. Newton as “an unreported case”). 
 433. Id. (referring to Talbott v. Stemmons as a “case not yet reported”). 
 434. Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik, 403 N.E.2d 683, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
 435. Id. at 687. 
 436. Id.
 437. Professor Corbin states that love and affection would not be 
consideration “even if the promise is given in order to induce, and actually does 
induce, feelings of love and affection in the promisee for the promisor [and] [e]ven 
if it is bargained for as a consideration.” ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 232, at 326 (One Volume ed. 1952); see also id. § 131, at 190-91. 
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situations in which a person’s love is not reciprocated.438 Perhaps 
particularly appropriate for arguing that love is not consideration is, 
“[C]an’t help falling in love with you.”439
Also, courts typically hold that a moral obligation is not 
consideration.440 In these cases, the courts implicitly reject the 
argument that consideration should be found because the promisor 
benefits from a clear conscience or the emotional relief of no longer 
feeling beholden to the other.  
Emotional benefits also can qualify as consideration when the 
promisor pays to improve or protect his or her reputation. Publicity 
about charitable giving can improve the donor’s reputation for 
power, wealth, and generosity.441 In addition to economic benefits 
that may ensue,442 there are the hard-to-value emotional benefits such 
as improved self-esteem, self-confidence, and personal satisfaction. 
The flip side is when reputation is tarnished. There can be 
economic and emotional costs. Shakespeare wrote, “Good name in 
man and woman . . . Is the immediate jewel of their souls: Who 
steals my purse steals trash . . . But he that filches from me my good 
name Robs me of that which not enriches him And makes me poor 
indeed.”443 Courts routinely enforce certain promises calling for a 
party to pay big money, and all the other side has to do is keep their 
mouth shut. These provisions reflect the workings of the 
embarrassing information market, and courts often enforce these 
provisions without even questioning whether the other side’s 
promise to merely keep their mouth shut is consideration. The 
implication is that remaining silent is a sufficient detriment to the 
 438. See, e.g., Gary Lewis and the Playboys: “This Diamond Ring”,
OLDIELYRICS, http://www.oldielyrics.com/lyrics/gary_lewis_and_the_playboys/this_ 
diamond_ring.html [https://perma.cc/9NRH-XUTN] (last visited Jan. 2, 2017); Bobby 
Vee—Take Good Care of My Baby Lyrics, SONGLYRICS, http://www.songlyrics.com/ 
bobby-vee/take-good-care-of-my-baby-lyrics/ [https://perma.cc/UZ5M-92UX] (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2017).  
 439. Elvis Presley—Can’t Help Falling in Love with You Lyrics,
SONGLYRICS, http://www.songlyrics.com/elvis-presley/can-t-help-falling-in-love-with-
you-lyrics/ [https://perma.cc/H5XP-E9QG] (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
 440. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 130, at 197 (stating the general 
rule but listing a variety of exceptions observed by some courts). 
 441. Posner, supra note 381, at 575-76. 
 442. See OSTROWER, supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the 
desire to obtain a position on the charity’s board of directors or other influential 
committee). 
 443. William Shakespeare, Othello act 3, sc. 3. 
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hushed, or a sufficient benefit to the party with secrets to hide, to 
avoid characterization as a gift. 
Several cases involve friends and lovers settling a potential 
lawsuit and trying to buy embarrassment avoidance. The seminal 
case is Trump v. Trump,444 in which Donald and Ivana Trump signed 
a prenuptial agreement eighteen days before their wedding,445
providing in part that in the event of divorce Donald Trump would 
pay Ivana Trump a lump sum of $10 million plus $350,000 per year, 
and Ivana Trump would not “publish . . . any diary, memoir, 
letter . . . article . . . account, or description or depiction of . . . [the] 
marriage . . . or any other aspect of [her] husband’s personal, 
business or financial affairs.”446 After their divorce, Ivana Trump 
filed an action to challenge the confidentiality provision, arguing that 
(i) it was not incorporated into the divorce decree and (ii) it 
restrained protected speech. Without questioning whether Donald 
Trump’s payments were supported by adequate consideration, the 
court rejected Ivana Trump’s arguments and concluded that the 
confidentiality provision was enforceable.447
Building on the Trump case, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, the 
court considered a divorce settlement agreement under which the ex-
husband was obligated to pay maintenance to his ex-wife, but if the 
ex-wife discussed certain information the ex-husband could reduce 
his payments by $500,000 per breach.448 The confidentiality 
provision included some of the same language from the agreement in 
Trump but specifically stated that the ex-wife agreed not to “make 
any remarks or relate any information about the intimate life of [her 
ex-husband]” or “make any disparaging remarks about [his] 
personal, private or family life.”449 The ex-wife sued to collect 
maintenance payments due, and the ex-husband attempted to offset 
arguing the ex-wife had breached the confidentiality clause. The 
court did not discuss whether the promise of confidentiality 
constituted valid consideration but cited the Trump case and stated, 
 444. 582 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (concluding that a 
confidentiality clause was enforceable); see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 649 
N.Y.S.2d 665, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (Ellerin, J., concurring) (referring to Trump
as the seminal case). 
 445. They amended the agreement at least twice during their marriage. 
Trump, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. 
 446. Id.
 447. Id. at 1011.  
 448. 649 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
 449. Id.
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“[W]e have previously found that such a confidentiality agreement is 
enforceable.”450 The court agreed with the ex-husband that the 
confidentiality provision was enforceable but ultimately sided with 
the ex-wife because the ex-husband failed to produce sufficient 
evidence that it was the ex-wife who had disclosed certain 
information about him to the media.451
In these friends and lovers confidentiality cases, rather than 
focusing on whether a promise to keep quiet about embarrassing 
details is adequate consideration, the courts focus on whether the 
contract can be rescinded on other grounds, such as public policy or 
duress. In Kaplan v. Kaplan,452 after the husband and wife separated, 
the wife hired private investigators that “forcibly broke into an 
apartment and took photographs of [the husband] and another 
woman.”453 The wife “expressly threatened to publicize the 
photographs by suing the other woman for alienation of affections” 
and taking other actions designed to cause “great embarrassment” to 
the husband, the other woman, and to the other woman’s family.454 In 
connection with the divorce, the husband signed an agreement to pay 
“permanent alimony” of $5,200 per year for the life of his ex-wife.455
Three years later, after the husband had remarried and the other 
woman in the photograph had married someone else, the husband 
sought to have the settlement agreement set aside because the wife 
had provided no consideration for his promise to pay permanent 
alimony and because he signed under duress.456 In regards to 
consideration, the court summarily stated that the mutual promises 
provided consideration because both husband and wife had waived 
their marital rights under the property settlement. The court made no 
analysis concerning the relative economic value of each side’s 
marital rights.457 In regards to duress, the court stated that “it is not 
duress to institute or threaten to institute civil suits”;458 the wife had 
an “honest belief . . . that she had a cause of action for alienation of 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 667.  
 452. 182 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ill. 1962) (concluding that a party can threaten to 
disclose embarrassing details about another person’s behavior and collect money for 
keeping that information secret). 
 453. Id. at 708. 
 454. Id.
 455. Id. at 707-08 (stating that the agreement was subject to adjustments if 
the ex-wife remarried or enjoyed an increase in income).  
 456. Id. at 707.  
 457. Id. at 708. 
 458. Id. at 709. 
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affections,” and “duress is not shown by subjecting one to annoyance 
or vexation.”459
More recently, in Jordan v. Knafel,460 Karla Knafel told 
basketball star Michael Jordan that he was the father of her child. In 
response to her threat to file a paternity suite, Jordan agreed to pay 
her $250,000 promptly, and then $5 million upon his retirement from 
professional sports, in exchange for her promise of silence.461 After it 
was determined that Jordan was not the father, and Jordan had retired 
from professional sports, Knafel filed a counterclaim against Jordan 
for the $5 million.462 One of Jordan’s arguments was that the 
agreement was against public policy because paying money in 
exchange for silence is “inherently extortionate.”463 The court 
rejected this argument and instead said, “there is a presumption of 
validity and enforceability attaching to settlement agreements which 
include confidentiality provisions.”464 The court stated that the three 
classes of contracts for silence that may violate public policy are 
(i) contracts to suppress information about harmful products, 
(ii) agreements to conceal criminal conduct, and (iii) contracts that 
constitute blackmail.465
The risk that a contract of silence will be unenforceable 
because of blackmail increases when the only cause of action is 
breach of contract. In contrast to the cases described above involving 
property rights under pre-marital agreements or divorce settlements, 
attorney Richard Yao sued a former lover simply for breach of 
contract.466 Yao asserted that after a “brief, intimate relationship” 
with John Bult, a wealthy financial executive, he and Bult entered 
into an oral contract in which Yao agreed not to publicize “certain 
embarrassing information about Mr. Bult’s personal life” in 
exchange for “$10,000 per month for life.”467 When Bult failed to 
pay after the first month, Yao sued for breach of contract seeking 
 459. Id. at 710. 
 460. 823 N.E.2d 1113, 1120 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (concluding that a party can 
threaten to disclose information about another and collect money for agreeing to 
keep the information secret). 
 461. Id. at 1117.  
 462. Id. at 1116, 1122. 
 463. Id. at 1119. 
 464. Id.
 465. See id.
 466. See In re Yao, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(disciplinary proceeding against Yao for filing the breach of contract action in Yao v. 
Bult, 666 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).  
 467. See id. 
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$15 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. 
The trial court dismissed Yao’s claim of breach of contract saying 
that the contract was against public policy, and the trial court fined 
Yao $10,000 and Yao’s trial attorney $1,000 for filing a frivolous 
lawsuit.468 In a subsequent action to disbar Yao, Yao submitted a 
pleading asserting that Bult was a “sexual predator who had a history 
of pouncing on younger innocent victims and exposing them to the 
threat of HIV and AIDS.”469 Nevertheless, Yao had only sued for 
breach of contract at the trial court, and in the disciplinary 
proceeding the court disbarred Yao for committing extortion and 
engaging in frivolous litigation.470
Courts routinely enforce confidentiality clauses in commercial 
contracts471 if they are not an undue restraint of trade.472 One 
commentator discusses Bill Gates’s use of a confidentiality clause in 
dealing with a construction firm working on his $40 million home.473
In Coady v. Harpo, Inc., a court enforced a confidentiality clause in 
the employment contract of the senior associate producer of The 
Oprah Winfrey Show.474 The clause required the producer to “keep 
confidential, during her employment and thereafter, all information 
about the Company, Ms. Winfrey, [and] her private life.”475
III. NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITIES AND JUDICIAL OPTIONS WITH 
CONTRACT LAW
One commentator contrasts the “world of contract” and the 
“world” of gifts,476 and this terminology appropriately dramatizes 
that radically different things happen depending on whether planners 
 468. Id. at 201. 
 469. In re Yao, 680 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 470. Id. at 548. 
 471. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom 
of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 269-70 (1998). 
 472. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 
1999).
 473. Garfield, supra note 471, at 273 (citing Dee Ann Glamser, No Place 
Like Home for Gates–a $40M Home, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1996, at 6A). 
 474. 719 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding that a contract is 
enforceable when one party pays money, in part, for the other party’s secrecy). 
 475. Id. at 246. 
 476. See Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 823. Professor Eisenberg apparently 
would land a charitable pledge on the world of gifts if it “is not expressly 
conditional on a reciprocal exchange . . . even though the [donor] is subjectively 
motivated by a desire to be invited onto the [charity’s] board or to enhance her status 
in the community.” Id. at 823-24 n.14. 
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and courts choose to apply contract law or gift law. Contract law is 
intricate and detailed. The first-year law school curriculum typically 
devotes four to six credit hours exclusively to contract law,477 and 
contracts casebooks routinely exceed 1,000 pages in length.478 In 
contrast, the law of gifts typically is shunted off to a corner of the 
property law course, and property law casebooks may spend less 
than twenty or thirty pages on the law of gifts.479
A. Negotiating Duration, Bad Boy, and Other End-Game Terms 
As with different worlds, each legal regime has its own 
separate atmosphere. The gift world often has a casual atmosphere; 
making a gift usually is a simple matter. Who hires an attorney to 
orchestrate a transaction consisting of a birthday gift or holiday 
present to a family member? A casual atmosphere may also pervade 
charitable contribution transactions. Even when a charity requests 
big money, it may expect the donor to sign a one-page pledge form. 
A review of fifty-seven pledge forms and agreements available 
online found that “[a] standard charitable pledge form typically is 
less than one page,” although there was no indication that the pledge 
forms surveyed involved naming rights.480 An attorney practicing in 
this area states, “I’ve seen very explicit agreements, but I’ve also 
seen instances where people make naming rights gifts with nothing 
more than a pledge form—just trusting the institution.”481
The typical one-page pledge form tends to address only the  
[Total] gift amount, the number of donations, the timing of donations (e.g.,
monthly, quarterly, annually), donation method (e.g., check or credit card), 
designated purpose . . ., [any] matching gift information, donor 
information . . ., and publicity preference (e.g., anonymous, in honor of a 
decedent, naming rights, or other).”482 These one-page pledge forms do 
 477. Marc L. Roark, The Contracts Course Survey, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 435, 
436-37 (2012) (“The average hourly credit total for the contracts course is 5.04 
hours.”).
 478. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE
(5th ed. 2012) (with 1138 pages); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL &
HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th 
ed. 2016) (with 1183 pages). 
 479. See, e.g., FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLE-ALLGIRE, supra note 188, at 
205-36; JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 157-72 (6th ed. 2006); JOHN E.
CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 213-35 (9th ed. 2008). 
 480. Drennan, supra note 90, at 495.  
 481. Pomorski, supra note 26 (quoting Ellis Carter, a lawyer representing 
both charities and donors). 
 482. Drennan, supra note 90, at 495. 
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“not include the boiler-plate clauses usually [found] in a binding contract, 
such as a forum selection clause, choice of law clause, jurisdiction and 
venue clause, severability clause, waiver clause, or costs of collection and 
attorney fees clause.”483
On the other hand, if the charity and the donor are willing to 
embrace the world of contracts at the time the donor promises to 
give, they may negotiate and agree upon a variety of important 
topics. Some highly sophisticated donors seek to negotiate and 
document big contributions as precisely as commercial 
transactions.484 A few cases already discussed in this Article reveal 
topics the parties could agree on in advance to avoid disputes and 
reach reasonable results when circumstances change.  
1. Duration Problems: The Perils of Perpetuity 
One researcher, after an extensive study, concludes that 
“traditionally, naming rights were granted in perpetuity.”485
Unfortunately, experience shows that a promise of perpetual naming 
over a building or other depreciating property sets the stage for 
trouble. Someday, the charity will need to renovate the building or 
other depreciating property, and at that time the charity will need to 
offer naming rights for the building or property to a new big donor to 
raise the money to renovate.486
In the case of a gift of undeveloped land, there may be a 
stronger case for granting the donor a perpetual naming right because 
undeveloped land does not depreciate.487 Thus, a donor may 
contribute land to a church or a hospital with the condition that the 
land must revert back to the donor or the donor’s descendants if the 
charity ever uses the land for something other than a church or a 
 483. Id.
 484. Shakely, supra note 20 (“The . . . currently dominant model is 
Transactional Philanthropy, or Charity by Lawyers. Here the charitable impulse is 
codified. . . . Transactional philanthropy contracts often spell out the terms of a gift 
with great specificity.”). 
 485. BURTON, supra note 19, at 2. But see id. at 143, 163-64 (suggesting that 
charities might find it advantageous to limit the duration). 
 486. Id. at 162-64; Pogrebin, supra note 376 (quoting Michael M. Kaiser, 
Chairman of the DeVos Institute of Arts Management at the University of 
Maryland) (indicating that charities granting perpetual naming rights on buildings 
are shortsighted). 
 487. NEWMAN & BROWN, supra note 147, at 242 (“[V]acant land does not 
depreciate.”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 946, HOW TO DEPRECIATE
PROPERTY 6 (2016).  
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hospital.488 In that case, the land may maintain its value and may be 
easily identified decades or even centuries later.  
In contrast, when a donor contributes for the construction and 
naming of a building, the named property invariably will need 
renovation or replacement.489 In negotiating a duration for the naming 
rights in these situations, a starting point could be that the duration of 
the naming rights should not exceed the named property’s 
depreciable life for tax purposes if the charity could claim a tax 
deduction for the depreciation of the property.490 For example, the 
depreciable life of non-residential real estate is generally thirty-nine 
years.491 Alternatively, the parties could negotiate that the naming 
right would expire when the charity commences a fundraising 
campaign for a reasonably needed renovation of the building.  
The Lincoln Center and Fisher family situation demonstrates 
the potential consequences of failing to negotiate a reasonable 
duration for naming rights492 and suggests possibilities in negotiation. 
Avery Fisher contributed $10.5 million toward the renovation of 
Lincoln Center’s philharmonic hall in 1973, and Lincoln Center 
agreed to use the name Avery Fisher “on tickets, brochures, program 
announcements . . . and the like . . . in perpetuity.”493 In 2002, when 
Lincoln Center began renovating the rest of its campus, the Fisher 
family threatened legal action if Lincoln Center tried to raise funds to 
renovate the philharmonic hall by selling the right to name the hall.494
As a result, Lincoln Center delayed renovation on the philharmonic 
hall while its patrons complained about bad acoustics and poor 
amenities.495 Lincoln Center was unable to negotiate a settlement 
with the Fisher family until 2014. Because of the failure to negotiate 
the transaction like a contract, the charity had to pay the Fisher 
 488. See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 
400 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 489. BURTON, supra note 19, at 143, 162-64; Pogrebin, supra note 376.  
 490. Presuming the charity is a tax-exempt organization under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) and the property is not regularly used in an unrelated trade or business 
under I.R.C. §§ 511-13, the charity would not be claiming depreciation deductions 
for the property under I.R.C. §§ 167-68.  
 491. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 487, at 34-35 (listing the 
depreciable period for “Nonresidential real property”). 
 492. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Lincoln 
Center situation). 
 493. Pogrebin, supra note 10. 
 494. Pogrebin, supra note 376. 
 495. Pogrebin, supra note 13 (referring to the hall as “outdated and 
acoustically problematic”).  
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family $15 million, grant the family various privileges,496 and delay 
the renovation for twelve years. 
With a contract view, Lincoln Center might have negotiated a 
twenty or thirty-year term on the naming rights when Avery Fisher 
contributed $10.5 million in 1973. Alternatively, at the time of the 
original gift, Lincoln Center might have negotiated for an end to the 
Fisher naming rights whenever Lincoln Center began a fundraising 
campaign for a reasonably necessary renovation. The negotiated 
contract might have provided that the Fisher family could continue to 
name the philharmonic hall if it contributed a certain percentage of 
the expected renovation costs.497
The Daughters of the Confederacy case498 also demonstrates 
potential negative consequences from failing to negotiate a limited 
duration. In the early 1930s, when the Daughters contributed just 
one-third of the original cost of building the dormitory, if Vanderbilt 
University’s predecessor had negotiated a duration clause of thirty, 
forty, or fifty years, Vanderbilt University could have removed the 
word “Confederate” from the dormitory’s pediment in connection 
with the $2.5 million renovation in 1987 and 1988.499 This would 
have been especially appropriate because the Daughters apparently 
contributed nothing to the $2.5 million renovation. The failure of its 
predecessor to negotiate a reasonable duration for the naming right 
cost Vanderbilt $1.2 million to remove the word “Confederate” from 
the dormitory in 2016.500
2. Bad Boy Clauses 
In his 2005 article, Professor Eason described many situations 
in which charities struggled to remove a disgraced donor’s name 
because it failed to negotiate a bad boy clause.501 A famous example 
involved former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski and Seton Hall 
 496. Pogrebin, supra note 10. There will be a prominent tribute to Mr. Fisher 
in the building lobby, Mr. Fisher will be inducted into the Lincoln Center Hall of 
Fame, and a Fisher family member will serve on the Hall of Fame’s advisory board. 
Id.
 497. Id. (discussing David H. Koch’s “right of first refusal” clause over his 
naming rights for the New York State Theater). 
 498. See supra notes 164-90 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 499. Vanderbilt University conducted the $2.5 million renovation in 1987 
and 1988. See Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 106, 116, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 500. Anderson, supra note 3. 
 501. See Eason, supra note 2, at 394-98.  
1340 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
University. Kozlowski achieved rock-star status as a successful 
executive until he was convicted for grand larceny and other crimes, 
and a judge sentenced him to at least eight years and four months, 
and up to twenty-five years, in prison.502 As his empire unraveled, the 
press published embarrassing stories about Kozlowski’s wasteful 
habits, such as paying $16,000 for a dog-shaped umbrella stand and 
$6,000 for a shower curtain hanging in the maid’s bathroom of his 
$18 million Manhattan apartment.503 Kozlowski also funded a $2 
million birthday party for his wife and their friends on the island of 
Sardinia in Italy complete with naked ice sculptures and Jimmy 
Buffet singing Happy Birthday.504 Despite the crime and 
extravagance, Kozlowski was extremely generous, having 
contributed $3 million to name the business school at Seton Hall.505
Apparently, various Seton Hall constituencies were not pleased about 
the bad publicity, and eventually Kozlowski and the President of 
Seton Hall negotiated an end to Kozlowski’s naming rights.506 This 
situation inspired an attorney practicing in this field to write that 
Kozlowski’s “voluntarily agreeing . . . suggests that Seton Hall did 
not have an automatic right to remove his name.”507
An interesting angle is the dynamics between the charity and 
the naming donor that necessitates a bad boy clause. The Tennessee 
Court of Appeals discussed the donor–charity relationship and the 
views of different constituencies in the Daughters of the 
Confederacy case. The Vanderbilt University Student Government 
Association asserted that in addition to acknowledging a financial 
contribution, naming a building after a donor, and preserving that 
 502. Grace Wong, Kozlowski Gets Up to 25 Years, CNN (Sept. 19, 2005, 
4:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/19/news/newsmakers/kozlowski_sentence/ 
[https://perma.cc/32JV-7KW5] (reporting that the sentence was 8-1/3 to 25 years, the 
fine was $70 million, and Kozlowski and the former Tyco CFO had to repay $134 
million to Tyco); Anthony Bianco, William Symonds & Nanette Byrnes, The Rise 
and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 65. 
 503. Goldberg, supra note 21, at 48 (discussing Kozlowski’s extravagant 
lifestyle); Mark Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, A $15,000 Umbrella Stand? 
Decorating the Tyco Way, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2002, 12:01 AM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032292279372822035 [https://perma.cc/M4NM-VNGC]. 
 504. See William A. Drennan, Enron-Inspired Nonqualified Deferred 
Compensation Rules: “If You Don’t Know Where You’re Going, You Might Not Get 
There.”, 73 TENN. L. REV. 415, 420-21 (2006). 
 505. Bianco et al., supra note 502; see also Goldberg, supra note 21, at 48 
(stating that Kozlowski also donated approximately $4 million to Cambridge 
University in England). 
 506. Goldberg, supra note 21, at 48. 
 507. Id.
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name, signals what the University celebrates and what it takes pride 
in.508 The Chancellor of the University stated that a building’s name 
commemorates the University’s values, and implies an endorsement,
and perhaps a celebration, of the named donor.509 In 2015, the 
Chancellor of Vanderbilt University said a name is a “symbol.”510 In 
athletics, naming a field after one coach rather than another may 
elevate his or her status and “undercuts the legacy of another.”511
A marketing professor observed that negative publicity about a 
naming donor may signal that the charity did not do its homework 
and tends to act recklessly. The professor said, “[R]umors about 
[comedian Bill] Cosby’s sexual conduct circulated for decades and 
should have been uncovered by any group thinking about accepting 
his money. . . . ‘It reflects on the operations, intentions and 
leadership of that organization. Why was that celebrity chosen? Was 
the organization just trying to play the fame game?’”512
With a contract approach, a charity might seek to negotiate that 
it can remove the donor’s name promptly upon the first publication 
of a creditable allegation that the donor: (i) committed an act of 
moral turpitude; (ii) committed a felony under state or federal law; or 
(iii) failed to act with due regard to social conventions, public 
morals, and decency.513 This may seem like an impossible 
negotiation. A practicing attorney in this area states, “[S]uch a clause 
may seem impolite to include in [a charitable donation] 
agreement.”514 Can a fundraiser really say to a donor, “We would 
greatly appreciate your $10 million contribution, and we will name 
 508. 174 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). A Vanderbilt Student 
Government Association resolution stated in part, “names on buildings are usually a 
sign of pride and thankfulness for the contributions made to construct them, but that 
Vanderbilt was not proud of the legacy of slavery attached to the name of 
Confederate Memorial Hall.” Id.; see also id. at 120 (summarizing the arguments of 
the parties regarding the name “Confederate,” but the court stated it decided the case 
on “neutral principles of law”).  
 509. Id. at 108. 
 510. Steven Hale, Vanderbilt to Officially Rename ‘Confederate Memorial’ 
Hall, NASHVILLE SCENE (Aug. 15, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.nashvillescene.com/ 
news/pith-in-the-wind/article/20830807/vanderbilt-to-officially-rename-confederate-
memorial-hall [https://perma.cc/F6ZY-Z5V5].  
 511. Tanier, supra note 79. 
 512. Gose, supra note 368 (quoting USC marketing professor Jeetendr 
Sehdev).
 513. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 50 (providing sample language for a 
moral clause). 
 514. Id.  
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the building after you, but we need you to sign a legally binding 
document protecting us if you commit an act of moral turpitude?” 
Although donors may resist including a bad boy clause, a 
contracts view may help a charity obtain a bad boy clause in at least 
three ways. First, many charities have naming rights policies.515
Sometimes, these primarily function as internal documents that set 
uniform rules for processing naming rights transactions.516 In 
addition to this internal function, however, a charity could seek to 
incorporate its naming rights policy into any substantial naming 
rights agreement with a donor. Thus, when a charity initially offers a 
significant naming right, it could start the negotiation by telling the 
donor that it has a standard form with a bad boy (or morals) clause. 
The University of Washington has made its policy available to the 
public, and it includes a provision allowing the University to remove 
a donor’s name if the donor no longer has a “positive image” or 
“demonstrated integrity.”517 Using a naming rights policy can allow 
the charity’s fundraisers to appear that they are merely following 
standard operating procedures when proposing the bad boy clause, 
rather than suggesting that the charity is concerned about one 
particular donor’s vices.  
Second, a charity might make a bad boy clause more palatable 
by including a somewhat reciprocal provision. Charities can do 
things that, if publicized, can embarrass some of their donors, such 
as funding the extravagant lifestyles of their executives,518
 515. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 139-52. 
 516. Internal consistency may be especially important for far-flung charities 
with loose organization structures. For example, a University’s Board of Regents 
may not want one school within the University system selling perpetual naming 
rights cheap, while another school in the same University system is demanding 
premium prices for naming rights over a term of years. 
 517. See BURTON, supra note 19, at 208 (quoting the University of 
Washington Facilities and Spaces Naming Policy). Elsewhere, the University’s 
policy provides, “A building or outdoor area may be named . . . based upon the 
following criteria[:] The individual . . . has a positive image and demonstrated 
integrity. In the event of changed circumstances, the University reserves the right, 
on reasonable grounds, to revise the form of or withdraw recognition in consultation 
with the donor when possible.” Id. at 203. 
 518. See, e.g., Anne Flaherty, FTC: Family Raised $187M for Cancer, Spent 
It on Themselves, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MO), May 20, 2015, at A1, 2015 
WLNR 14933562 (“[H]is family . . . [bought] themselves cars, gym memberships 
and [took] luxury cruise vacations . . . in one of the largest charity fraud cases ever, 
involving all 50 states.”). 
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discriminating against certain groups,519 and incurring excessive 
administrative costs. Furthermore, a charity may take a controversial 
position that a particular donor may not want to be associated with. 
For example, in 2015, Amnesty International adopted a “proposal in 
favor of the ‘full decriminalization of consensual sex work,’ sparking 
a storm of controversy.”520 In 2012, the Susan G. Komen Foundation 
(to fight breast cancer) announced it would cut off funding for 
Planned Parenthood and contributions dropped 22% during the next 
year.521 The charity’s standard form could include a clause allowing 
the donor to request a partial refund if the charity misbehaves or 
reasonably embarrasses the donor. Thus, when the charity’s 
philanthropic development officer seeks to obtain a donor’s 
agreement to a bad boy clause, the charity’s officials can point to a 
“bad charity” clause. 
Third, a contracts view can set a tone of bargaining in which 
both sides realistically understand they will not get everything they 
want. Thus, the charity may open the negotiation offering twenty-
year naming rights subject to a bad boy clause. Perhaps the donor 
will counter with thirty years and no bad boy clause; and maybe the 
parties settle on twenty-five years with a bad boy clause.  
B. Judicial Flexibility to Supply Missing Terms, Award Benefit-of-
the-Bargain Damages, and Employ Other Contract Tools  
Contract law is complex and can provide different doctrinal 
paths to follow when disputes arise. As an example, in the Courts
case, the donor gave her sizable life savings to the Hospital 
expecting a tribute to her deceased grandfather who apparently 
 519. See, e.g., Ari Nussbaum, Women’s Colleges Adopt Transgender 
Admissions Policies, Others Continue to Rally, CAMPANIL (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.thecampanil.com/womens-colleges-adopt-transgender-admissions-policies-
others-continue-to-rally/ [https://perma.cc/69GD-M62R] (reporting that “students at 
some women’s colleges are still fighting for change”). 
 520. Emily Bazelon, Should Prostitution Be a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
(May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/should-prostitution-be-a-
crime.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3V4-YLSW]. 
 521. Michael Hiltzik, Susan G. Komen Foundation Discovers the Price of 
Playing Politics, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-susan-g-komen-20140108-story.html [https://perma.cc/DFS4-
UQPJ]; Associated Press, Susan G. Komen for the Cure Contributions Plummet 
After Planned Parenthood Controversy, BLAZE (Jan. 4, 2014, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/01/04/susan-g-komen-for-the-cure-contributions-
plummet-after-planned-parenthood-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/L43D-SJT7].  
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provided exemplary service as a community leader.522 Unfortunately, 
the generous donor failed to express her desire for a memorial to her 
grandfather when mailing her stock certificates to the Hospital’s 
President. Under the law of gifts, the court held that the gift became 
complete and the terms were fixed once the President accepted the 
stock certificates, so there was no way to require the Hospital to 
grant naming rights. The court seemed unhappy with the result it 
reached, describing the Hospital’s executives as callous, but the court 
concluded that it had no choice under the law of gifts.523 In contrast, 
if the court had taken a contract view, it may have had two other 
choices based on (i) the contract law definition of “offer” and (ii) the 
ability of a court to supply an omitted term in a contract.  
1. Definition of Offer and the Courts Case 
If it had adopted a contracts view, the court in Courts might 
have reached a more balanced result. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts defines an “offer” as a “manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in 
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will 
conclude it.”524 In other words, under contract law, a statement is an 
offer only if the receiving party reasonably believes that the 
statement contains all the terms the sending party expects under the 
contract.
Judge Easterbrook has provided significant flexibility for 
courts analyzing whether a statement is an offer under the law of 
contracts. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,525 Judge Easterbrook 
considered a situation in which the seller advertised a computer for 
sale in a catalogue at a certain price.526 The customer ordered the 
computer over the phone and provided a credit card number for 
payment of the price. When the seller sent the computer to the 
customer, the seller included four pages of detailed terms and 
conditions in the box. The customer might argue the phone call was 
an offer, the seller accepted when it took the payment, and no 
 522. Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 864 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 523. Id. at 867-68.  
 524. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 525. 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a communication 
will only be an offer if it invites acceptance without further negotiation). 
 526. Id. at 1148-49; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 
(7th Cir. 1996) (involving computer software). 
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additional terms can be added thereafter. Under this approach, the 
customer would argue the four-page form with the terms and 
conditions included in the box never became a part of the contract 
because the terms of the contract became fixed once the seller 
accepted the payment. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority of 
the Seventh Circuit, concluded that although the customer ordered 
the computer and made arrangements for payment, this was not an 
offer under contract law because it would be unreasonable for a 
customer to believe that the seller of a computer would communicate 
all the terms and conditions to the buyer over the phone before the 
parties agreed on contract terms.527 Judge Easterbrook pointed out 
that if a seller attempted to read the terms and conditions to the 
customer over the phone before taking the customer’s order, the 
customer likely would end the call without placing an order.  
If the court in Courts had considered contract law, it might 
have found that it was unrealistic for the Hospital to believe, when it 
received the stock certificates, that the donor did not intend to 
specify any terms at all relative to how the funds should be used and 
the type of public recognition expected. Under Judge Easterbrook’s 
approach, the Hospital would make the offer, and Ms. Courts would 
have accepted much later, perhaps when she subsequently met with 
Hospital officials and discussed certain naming rights available at the 
Hospital.528 Thus, with a contracts view, the court could have reached 
an intermediate result and avoided a total victory for the callous 
Hospital.
2. Supplying an Omitted Term and the Courts Case 
Alternatively, the court might have reached a reasonable result 
under the contact rules by supplying an omitted term. The 
Restatement (Second) of Contacts and several cases hold that a court 
can supply a term in a contract even if the parties did not negotiate or 
agree on the item if it is essential to determine the rights and duties 
of the parties.529 One of the specific reasons a court may supply an 
 527. Id. at 1149; see also DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069 (R.I. 
2009) (indicating that ProCD represents the majority view). 
 528. Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 865 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 529. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see, e.g., Snyder v. Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodges, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 724, 
728 (S.D. Ill. 1976) (supplying a covenant that a restaurant will be operated 
consistently with defendant’s other restaurants).  
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omitted term is when the parties have “expectations but fail to 
manifest them.”530 Where there has been no agreement between the 
parties, but the court decides to supply an omitted term, the court 
should supply a “reasonable term based on a logical deduction from 
the agreed terms or, where that is not possible, [a term based] on 
standards of fairness . . . .”531 One court, speaking frankly, admits that 
in these circumstances a court is “to a considerable extent ‘remaking’ 
a contract . . . where it seem[s] necessary and appropriate so to 
do.”532
Thus, even if a court found that Ms. Courts made an offer that 
the Hospital accepted, the court might supply a reasonable naming 
right. This would have been especially appropriate in the Courts case 
because the Hospital deposited Ms. Court’s donation in an 
endowment, and the Hospital and the court both indicated it would 
have been appropriate to designate a “Courts Endowment” under the 
Hospital’s foundation.533
3. Bad Boy Clauses and Frustration of Purpose 
As discussed above, it may be difficult for a charity to 
negotiate a bad boy clause with a big donor.534 Even if they treat the 
naming rights transaction as a contract, the parties may fail to agree 
on a bad boy clause. Under the doctrine of frustration of purpose, a 
court may excuse a party from compliance with a contractual duty if 
“a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his 
fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”535 The classic 
example is the English case of Krell v. Henry in which the defendant 
rented a party room on a high floor so he and his friends could enjoy 
the coronation parade of King Edward VII.536 The King suddenly 
 530. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b. 
 531. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 500 (4th ed. 
2001); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (stating that 
the supplied term should comport “with community standards of fairness and 
policy”). 
 532. Parev Products Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 
1941).
 533. Courts, 431 S.E.2d at 867 (discussing the Hospital’s failure to 
adequately explain this option to Ms. Courts). 
 534. See supra note 514 and accompanying text. 
 535. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265. 
 536. Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.) (discussed in KNAPP,
CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 726). 
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became ill and cancelled the parade. The defendant’s duty to pay rent 
was not impossible because he and his friends could have occupied 
the room and watched an ordinary day go by on the street; 
nevertheless, the court held the defendant need not pay the promised 
rent because his principal purpose was frustrated.537
If a charity accepted a big donation and named a building or 
other space or place for the generous donor, and subsequently the 
naming arrangement would shame the charity because of publicity 
about the donor, perhaps a court would discharge the charity’s 
continuing naming obligation under this doctrine. A preliminary 
inquiry would be determining the charity’s principal purposes. Most 
likely the charity’s top priority was obtaining all the donor’s pledge 
payments so that it could afford the project. In addition, another 
principal purpose might have been inducing other donors to pledge 
by demonstrating that the charity thanks its donors by offering 
naming rights.538 The requirement that the intervening event was not 
the party’s fault probably would not be difficult; the charity likely 
had nothing to do with the donor’s misdeeds and subsequent public 
embarrassment.  
For a charity, in some circumstances, it may be challenging to 
prove that one of its principal purposes has been substantially 
frustrated. Has the donor’s reputation sufficiently slipped that having 
the donor’s name on the charity’s building damages the charity? Will 
the donor be able to apologize or take other steps to salvage his or 
her public reputation? Would it help the donor to regain his or her 
favorable reputation if the charity stands by the donor and keeps the 
donor’s name on the building? Some celebrities have made public-
relations comebacks. Party-planning and home-decorating maven 
Martha Stewart was temporarily shunned for her conviction and 
imprisonment on insider securities trading charges,539 but she has 
regained her position as an endorsement juggernaut and was even 
inducted into the New Jersey Hall of Fame.540 Others who appeared 
to have lost their place on the public pedestal and have arguably 
 537. Id. at 745.  
 538. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 539. Etan Smallman, July 16, 2016 on this Day, DAILY MAIL (UK), July 16, 
2016, 2016 WLNR 21668711 (reporting that in 2004 Martha Stewart was sentenced 
to five months in jail). 
 540. Happy Birthday to Westport’s Martha Stewart, WESTPORT DAILY 
VOICE (WESTPORT, CT), Aug. 3, 2016, 2016 WLNR 23665044. 
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recovered might include professional athlete Kobe Bryant,541 actor 
Robert Downey Jr.,542 and politician Mark Sanford.543
Perhaps one indication that a charity faces harm to its public 
image is whether other institutions have abandoned the donor. For 
example, Bill Cosby has lost honorary academic degrees in the wake 
of numerous allegations of sexual assault and rape.544 The President 
of Brown University stated the rescission “was a result of [Cosby’s] 
not living up to the institutional values on which [Brown University] 
was based,” and the rescission constitutes a “public denunciation[] of 
his actions.”545 A reporter described it as an attempt to shield the 
school from the “ongoing blowback.” The International Tennis Hall 
of Fame expelled tennis star Bob Hewitt after his conviction on 
charges of rape and sexual assault of minors.546 Wheaton College has 
removed the name of former Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Illinois Congressman Dennis Hastert from its 
Center for Economics, Government, and Public Policy in connection 
with his indictment for a financial crime linked to allegations of sex 
with minors.547 The State of Illinois has refused to hang a portrait of 
 541. Dave Zirin, Wrestling with Kobe Bryant’s Forgotten Apology,
NATION’S BLOGS, Apr. 19, 2016, 2016 WLNR 11881935.  
 542. Tom Payne, Iron Man Star Wins Pardon for Drug Bust, DAILY MAIL 
(UK), Dec. 26, 2015, at 36, 2015 WLNR 38368566 (discussing a pardon of Robert 
Downey’s 1996 drug conviction). 
 543. Rex Smith, Second Acts Arise from Failed Efforts, ALBANY TIMES
UNION, Feb. 6, 2016, at D1 (reporting that Mark Sanford resigned as governor of 
South Carolina after admitting an affair with a mistress but was elected to Congress 
two years later). 
 544. Adrienne Green & Alia Wong, Bill Cosby Is Being Stripped of His 
Honorary Doctorates But What’s the Point?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2015), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/bill-cosby-is-being-stripped-of-his-
honorary-doctorates/408235/ [https://perma.cc/C2HJ-QG7] (reporting that Brown, 
Fordham, and Marquette have rescinded degrees they bestowed). 
 545. Id.
 546. Kristen De Groot, Murky Legacy Follows Tennis Pioneer: A Historical 
Marker for Bill Tilden is Blocked Because of His History of Sexual Misconduct,
L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2016, at 1; Tanisha Heiberg & James Macharia, South African 
Court Dismisses Ex-tennis Star Bob Hewitt’s Appeal Against Rape Conviction,
REUTERS (June 9, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-hewitt-
idUSKCN0YV1B9 [https://perma.cc/95A2-8GRA].  
 547. Katherine Skiba, Amid Allegations, Some Consider Removing Dennis 
Hastert’s Presence, CHI. TRIB. (June 13, 2015, 6:18 AM), http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/news/ct-hastert-portrait-us-capitol-20150612-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/767B-XL88]. 
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former Governor Rod Blagojevich in the Illinois Capital Building as 
a result of his impeachment for corruption.548
4. Bad Boy Clauses and Supplying Omitted Terms 
As discussed above in connection with duration clauses, a court 
can supply an omitted term to a contract if it is essential to determine 
the rights and duties of the parties. As more and more donors are 
disgraced and the publicity surrounding this issue intensifies, it may 
be more likely that courts will be more understanding to a charity’s 
argument that it is essential to remove the donor’s name. A factor 
may include the extent of the donor’s misdeeds. For example, a court 
might be more likely to find de-naming essential when the donor is 
charged with being a sexual predator than when there are rumors the 
donor had a consensual extramarital affair.  
5. Remedies: The All-or-Nothing Approach Under the Law of 
Gifts
Under the law of gifts, the donor will receive a huge windfall, 
or will receive nothing, depending on whether the court finds the 
charity satisfied the condition. Two cases demonstrate the extremes 
when the parties fail to agree on the duration for charitable naming 
rights. In St. Mary’s Medical Center, a hospital wished to tear down 
a chapel serving as a memorial to a deceased donor.549 Although at 
the time of the gift the parties failed to agree on a term for the 
memorial, the court held that because the Hospital maintained the 
chapel for fifty years, it had substantially complied with its naming 
obligation.550 As a result, the family received nothing when the 
Hospital tore down the memorial to the donor.551 On the other hand, 
in the Daughters of the Confederacy case, certain facts were similar, 
but the court reached the opposite result.552 At the time of the 
contribution, the parties failed to agree on a term for the Daughters’ 
 548. Doug Finke, Blago the Only Illinois Governor Without an Official 
Portrait, RRSTAR.COM (Jan. 28, 2010, 12:01 AM) http://www.rrstar.com/ x690798567/ 
Blago-the-only-Illinois-governor-without-an-official-portrait [https://perma.cc/SUB2-
4ABK]. 
 549. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
 550. Id. at 1076.  
 551. Id. at 1077.  
 552. See generally Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
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naming rights on a university dormitory. For approximately seventy 
years, Vanderbilt University (and its predecessors) named the 
dormitory “Confederate Memorial Hall,” but when Vanderbilt 
University wished to remove the word “Confederacy” from the 
pediment of the dormitory, the court did not discuss substantial 
compliance.553 Instead, the court concluded that if Vanderbilt 
removed the word in 2005, it would violate a condition of the gift 
and must return the entire original $50,000 donation plus earnings on 
that amount through 2005 of approximately $700,000.554 In 2016, 
Vanderbilt announced that it would remove the word “Confederate” 
and pay $1.2 million.555 The Daughters’ recovery was not reduced in 
any way to recognize that the Daughters had enjoyed the naming 
rights for over seventy years.  
One could reasonably anticipate that under the law of gifts 
courts would face a similar all-or-nothing choice if the donor and the 
charity failed to agree on a bad boy clause, and the charity removed 
the donor’s name because of the donor’s improprieties. A court 
following St. Mary’s Medical might conclude that the charity had 
substantially complied by honoring the naming contributor for a long 
time before the adverse publicity. In contrast, a court might use the 
Daughters of the Confederacy approach and conclude the charity 
simply violated the naming condition and therefore must repay the 
entire amount of the donation plus earnings based on the consumer 
price index,556 with no reduction for the prior naming. In a naming 
rights case, the court might prefer the Daughter of the Confederacy
approach and apply “neutral principles” of law.557 This may help the 
court avoid appearing to judge the donor. 
6.  Remedies: Some Flexibility in Contract Law 
The normal approach for calculating the plaintiff’s money 
damages in a breach of contract case is to determine the value of the 
promised performance breached,558 also called the “expectation 
 553. Id. at 105-06.  
 554. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 555. Anderson, supra note 3. 
 556. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 557. See Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 120 (the court stated 
that it applied “neutral principles” in holding for the Daughters of the Confederacy). 
 558. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 852 (quoting Lon L. 
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 57 (1936)). 
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interest” or the “benefit of the bargain.”559 The theory is that “the 
breach may cause the injured party a loss by depriving that party, at 
least to some extent, of the performance expected under the 
contract.”560 The method for calculating the basic damage amount is 
“[t]he difference between the value to the injured party of the 
performance that should have been received and the value to that 
party of what, if anything, actually was received.”561
Courts have applied this method for calculating the amount of 
basic damages to different types of contract cases.562 As an 
illustration of how courts use the method,  
If . . . a buyer of goods has a claim for damages for partial breach because 
the goods were nonconforming, the loss in value equals the difference 
between the value to the buyer of the goods that were to have been 
delivered and the value of the goods that were actually delivered.563
With a construction contract, “the reasonable cost of replacement or 
completion is the measure.”564 In a “contract for the sale of land, the 
difference between the contract price and the market value 
constitutes general damages.”565 In addition to the general damages, 
the innocent party can recover “any other loss, including incidental 
or consequential loss, caused by the breach,”566 with limits.  
The parties can agree on the damages in the contract; these 
provisions are sometimes included in an “endgame” section.567 Thus, 
the parties could, in effect, specify prices for the charity to buy out 
the donor’s naming rights at different times. In the Fisher family–
Lincoln Center dispute, the parties had to arrive at their own 
settlement amount in 2014 when Lincoln Center was under 
 559. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
 560. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 854 (quoting E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 765 (4th ed. 2004)). 
 561. Id.
 562. Id. at 853. 
 563. Id. at 854 (quoting FARNSWORTH, supra note 560, at 765) (emphasis 
added).
 564. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectman, 80 A.D.2d 318, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981).
 565. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 881. 
 566. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b). The amount 
recoverable would be reduced by any cost or loss that the innocent party avoided as 
a result of the breach. Id. § 347(c). 
 567. TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS 
DO WHAT THEY DO 191 (2d ed. 2013). 
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significant pressure to reach a deal.568 Perhaps Lincoln Center could 
have negotiated a more favorable buy-out deal with Avery Fisher in 
1973 when Fisher made his $10.5 million donation.569 In regards to 
setting the amount of the liquidated damages amounts in a contract, 
the Restatement provides: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but 
only at an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual 
loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term 
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds 
of public policy as a penalty.570
There are restrictions on the amount of damages the plaintiff 
can recover; two are especially relevant. The landmark case of 
Hadley v. Baxendale establishes that the plaintiff cannot recover 
more than the potential damages each party reasonably 
contemplated.571 Another key restriction is that the plaintiff must 
prove damages with reasonable certainty, and the damages cannot be 
too speculative.572
One appellate court has applied the too speculative rule in a 
naming rights case but in a very strange manner. In the Daughters of 
the Confederacy case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals concluded 
that the charitable naming rights transaction was a gift and not a 
contract, sided with the Daughters, and allowed the Daughters to 
receive a full refund of their donation plus earnings based on the 
consumer price index.573 In dicta, and without a full explanation, the 
court said that if it allowed the Daughters to receive interest on the 
original donation rather than earnings based on the consumer price 
index, “[s]uch an approach would invite an offset defense by 
Vanderbilt and would require the trial court to attempt to quantify the 
 568. Pogrebin, supra note 10. 
 569. See id. In 1973, Fisher might not have demanded that his estate receive 
a high buy-out price if Lincoln Center removed his name after his death.  
 570. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1). 
 571. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), reprinted in KNAPP,
CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 878; Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectman, 439 
N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). The test is objective, at least in part, 
because the “breaching party is liable for losses about which it had reason to know.” 
KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 478, at 882. 
 572. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (“Damages are not 
recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established 
with reasonable certainty.”). 
 573. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
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value to the [Daughters] . . . of having the inscription on the 
pediment of the building for the past seventy years.”574
Normally the plaintiff would need to prove the amount of 
contract damages, so if there was a dispute over the value of a 
charitable naming right, it normally would be the donor who would 
need to quantify. But in the Daughters of the Confederacy case, as 
discussed above, the court reversed expectations and placed the 
burden to value on the charity. After placing the burden on 
Vanderbilt University, the court stated, “Determining the value of an 
inscription is not a matter that is subject to easy proof or to 
reasonably definite calculation, and any attempt to do so would lead 
to a calculation of damages that was impermissibly speculative in 
nature.575 In support, the court cited Prentis Family Foundation v. 
Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, but in that case only the 
trial court considered the value of the naming rights, and the 
appellate court did not address that topic.576
The courts in Allegheny College, Stock, and Dunaway said the 
relevant charitable naming transaction was a contract, but 
unfortunately none of those cases provide guidance on valuing 
charitable naming rights transactions.577 In Allegheny College, the 
College did not remove, or even threaten to remove, the donor’s 
name from the scholarship fund; instead, the College was suing to 
collect the balance of the pledge.578 In both Stock and Dunaway, the 
donors paid the charities the full amounts promised under the 
pledges, but the charities never named the properties after the 
donors.579 As a result, the courts ordered full refunds of the gifts and 
did not need to reduce the damage awards for the value of enjoying 
the naming rights for a period of time. 
Valuing charitable naming rights will be difficult, but the 
refusal to value leads to extreme results as demonstrated in the 
Daughters of the Confederacy case.580 Estimating values makes more 
sense when the naming rights last for only a period of years (either 
 574. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 575. Id.
 576. Prentis Family Found. v. Karmanos Cancer Inst., 698 N.W.2d 900, 913 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 577. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 
1927); Stock v. Augsburg Coll., 2002 WL 555944 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002); 
Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 442 P.2d 93 (Ariz. 1968). 
 578. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 174. 
 579. Stock, 2002 WL 555944 at *7; Dunaway, 442 P.2d at 95. 
 580. Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 119. 
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by express agreement or when the court supplies a reasonable term) 
or covers property with a limited useful life (such as a building). In 
the cases involving the dormitory named for the Daughters of the 
Confederacy and the chapel at the St. Mary’s Medical Center, the 
donors enjoyed naming rights for a period of years beyond the 
expected useful lives of the buildings. As a result, in the contracts 
world, a court could conclude that the donors received the benefits of 
the bargain and would have no damages. If a charity breached an 
express or supplied agreement and terminated a donor’s naming 
rights, a court might reduce the refund using a fraction, with the 
numerator being the number of years the donor has enjoyed naming 
rights, and the denominator being the number of years the parties 
agreed to, or reasonably expected.  
CONCLUSION
In choosing a legal regime for charitable naming rights 
transactions, a contract approach offers several potential benefits. 
First is flexibility in initially structuring the arrangement. For 
example, it may be beneficial if the charity approaches the 
arrangement as a contract negotiation with a standard publicity 
policy and a standard naming rights agreement that includes options 
regarding: (i) choices of public recognition methods;581 (ii) the 
duration of the naming rights and other publicity; and (iii) the terms 
of a bad boy clause allowing the charity to remove the donor’s name 
in the event of varying degrees of shame, misdeeds, and proof.582
With this contract approach, the charity may be more likely to obtain 
the donor’s consent to a package that includes a bad boy clause and a 
limited duration for the naming rights. In contrast, if the parties 
proceed as if this is a gift and the donor should propose all the terms, 
it may be more difficult for the charity’s representative to even 
mention the charity’s need for a bad boy clause and a reasonable 
duration for the naming rights.  
A second benefit is the potential certainty offered by contract 
law in carrying out, managing, and enforcing these arrangements 
throughout the term of the deal for items that the parties agreed upon. 
 581. Types of publicity may include naming rights on a building or other 
space or place, prominent discussion on the charity’s website or in the charity’s 
newsletter, and placement of the donor’s portrait at the building. See BURTON, supra
note 19, at 67-68, 100-01. 
 582. See supra notes 501-21 and accompanying text (discussing bad boy 
clauses). 
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A third potential benefit is the judicial flexibility in resolving 
disputes on items that the parties failed to agree upon. Courts could 
use contract doctrines to supply omitted terms and award benefit-of-
the-bargain damages specifically tailored to the particular situation.  
Over the past few decades, society has depended more on 
contractual approaches to respect the freedom of parties to negotiate 
and arrange their own affairs.583 Following this trend could be helpful 
for those involved in the creative, controversial, and expanding 
market for charitable naming rights.
 583. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995) (“Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in 
modern American law.”). 
